The Gulf became the bridge Pakistan was meant to be

The global logistics map is being redrawn in real time. The Red Sea, once treated as little more than a maritime passage linking Europe to Asia through the Suez Canal, has become the center of a contest over where the world’s cargo is handled. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 aims to transform the Kingdom into a global logistics hub, with investments exceeding $150 billion in transport and logistics infrastructure. The UAE continues to leverage Dubai and Abu Dhabi as integrated maritime, air and land connectivity centers, while Qatar and Oman have positioned themselves as fixtures in regional supply chains. Even tiny Djibouti, with a population of less than 1.2 million, has emerged as East Africa’s principal logistics gateway through aggressive port development and foreign partnerships. 

Pakistan, meanwhile, remains a country of immense logistical promise that has yet to convert strategic geography into strategic advantage. 

The numbers tell a sobering story. Pakistan ranked 122nd out of 160 countries on the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index in 2018, down from 68th two years earlier. In the 2023 assessment it did not appear at all, having failed to supply enough survey data to be ranked. Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port alone handles more than 15 million TEUs a year, making it one of the world’s busiest container ports. Saudi ports handled over 320 million tons of cargo in 2024, and the Kingdom’s National Transport and Logistics Strategy seeks to place Saudi Arabia among the world’s top ten logistics nations by the end of the decade. Pakistan’s two principal ports, Karachi Port and Port Qasim, remain plagued by congestion, fragmented governance and inconsistent policy implementation. 

Pakistan’s strategic location should have made it the natural logistics bridge between the Gulf and Central Asia. Instead, the Gulf became the bridge itself. 

The Red Sea crisis triggered by Houthi attacks from late 2023 accelerated that shift. Shipping costs surged as carriers rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding days to transit times and forcing companies to rethink their supply chains. Gulf states responded not with panic but with investment. Saudi Arabia accelerated the expansion of King Abdullah Port and the logistics zones around Jeddah. The UAE doubled down on its multimodal infrastructure strategy. Oman positioned Salalah and Duqm as alternatives for rerouted cargo. Carriers have begun returning to the Suez route this year, cautiously and in phases. The infrastructure the Gulf built during the disruption has not gone away with it. 

Pakistan, by comparison, remained largely absent from the conversation. 

That absence is particularly striking given the billions invested under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Gwadar Port was envisioned as Pakistan’s answer to Dubai and Singapore: a gateway connecting western China, Central Asia and the Arabian Sea. Yet in 2026, Gwadar remains closer to a geopolitical talking point than an economic reality. The port has handled less cargo in a year than some Gulf ports process in a day. 

Geography offered us a seat at the table. Policy ensured we remained outside the room. 

-Hina Ayra

Pakistan made the classic mistake of believing infrastructure alone creates economic ecosystems. It does not. Dubai did not become Dubai because of cranes and concrete. It became Dubai because policymakers created certainty. Investors knew regulations would not change overnight and institutions would function. Pakistan built ports without building institutions. 

Consider the bureaucracy surrounding trade and logistics. Multiple ministries exercise overlapping jurisdictions over ports, customs, shipping, trade facilitation and transport. Decisions requiring weeks in Gulf capitals routinely take months, sometimes years, in Islamabad. Investors entering Pakistan’s logistics sector encounter an administrative maze that would challenge even the most patient multinational. 

International law and global trade frameworks also matter. Under the World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement, states are expected to simplify customs procedures, enhance transparency and facilitate cross-border trade. Pakistan ratified the agreement in 2015 and has made progress through initiatives like the Pakistan Single Window. Yet implementation remains uneven. Trade facilitation cannot succeed when regulatory agencies continue to operate in silos, or when digitization remains incomplete. 

Saudi Arabia’s logistics strategy integrates ports with industrial cities, rail networks, airports and free economic zones. The UAE connects maritime infrastructure with aviation through Emirates and Etihad. Gulf visa regimes have evolved to attract talent as well. Pakistan, by contrast, still struggles to connect Karachi’s ports efficiently with its own hinterland. 

History offers an uncomfortable lesson. In the 1960s, Karachi was among Asia’s most dynamic commercial centers. International airlines operated extensive routes, foreign investment flowed steadily and Pakistan’s economy was frequently cited as a development model. Gulf economies at the time were heavily dependent on oil revenues and relatively underdeveloped infrastructure. 

Six decades later, the positions have reversed. This is not merely an economic failure; it is a policy failure spanning successive governments and bureaucracies. Pakistan spent years debating whether Gwadar should compete with Dubai when the more intelligent strategy was for Gwadar to complement Gulf logistics networks. Geography offered us a seat at the table. Policy ensured we remained outside the room. 

The consequences extend beyond trade. Logistics competitiveness influences foreign investment, industrialization, employment and national security. The World Bank estimates that reducing trade costs can significantly boost exports and growth in developing economies. For Pakistan, where exports remain concentrated in low-value sectors and the trade deficit continues to press on foreign exchange reserves, efficient logistics is not a luxury. It is an economic necessity. 

The remedies are not mysterious. Pakistan must first acknowledge that logistics policy cannot remain fragmented: a unified national logistics authority with a clear mandate should replace the existing patchwork of institutions. Second, Gwadar should be repositioned as part of an integrated regional network linking the Gulf, Central Asia and western China, rather than as a standalone competitor. 

Third, trade facilitation reforms under the WTO framework must move from compliance exercises to genuine implementation. Fourth, Pakistan should actively pursue logistics partnerships with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman instead of viewing them solely as competitors. 

Most importantly, policymakers must abandon the illusion that strategic location automatically translates into strategic relevance. The Red Sea years have demonstrated a simple truth: nations do not become logistics hubs because of where they are located. They become logistics hubs because of the decisions they make. 

Hina Ayra is an economist and business consultant. X: @HinaAyra