A murky pipeline deal to send Russian gas to China shows Beijing’s dominance in the relationship

The Lakhta Center, which houses the headquarters of the Russian gas monopoly, Gazprom, is seen in St. Petersburg, Russia, on April 27, 2022. (AP File Photo)
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Updated 11 September 2025
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A murky pipeline deal to send Russian gas to China shows Beijing’s dominance in the relationship

  • The pipeline would carry gas from reserves in western Siberia through Mongolia to China
  • But various issues face Siberia 2, reason why it can’t completely replace Russia’s lost revenue from Europe

FRANKFURT, Germany: The head of Russia’s state-owned gas company Gazprom says it has a deal to build a pipeline to China, but there are many unanswered questions about the details of the agreement.
On paper, the project — known as the Power of Siberia 2 — would give Russia a way to replace some of the revenue from its decades of selling natural gas to Europe that was lost over its invasion of Ukraine. The pipeline would carry gas from reserves in western Siberia through Mongolia to China.
And what Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller called a “legally binding” memorandum to build the pipeline with the China National Petroleum Co. is a chance for Moscow and Beijing to underline their deepening ties against the United States.
Here are key issues surrounding the Power of Siberia 2 and why it can’t completely replace Russia’s lost revenue from Europe:
A new link to China
The pipeline would run 6,700 kilometers (4,163 miles) from gas fields in the Yamal Peninsula in western Siberia, past Lake Baikal in eastern Siberia, and then across Mongolia into China. For more than 50 years, Russia earned fat profits sending Yamal gas to Europe through pipelines leading west.
But Russia cut off most pipeline gas to Europe over the war in Ukraine, and the European Union wants to end the remaining trickle of supplies by 2027.
So the new pipeline would be a way to shift those lost gas sales to a big new customer.
 




Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Chinese President Xi Jinping greet each other in Tianjin, China, on Aug. 31, 2025. (Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)

The geopolitics of the deal
Power of Siberia 2 would carry 50 billion cubic meters a year to China, compared with the up to 180 billion cubic meters a year that went to Europe — meaning the new pipeline could only make up part of the lost business. It would supplement a previous, smaller Power of Siberia line that carries gas from different fields in eastern Siberia with a capacity of 38 billion cubic meters per year.
Miller’s announcement, which came during a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, left out key details. There was no agreement on gas prices or even who would finance the pipeline’s construction.
Analysts say the announcement was primarily a chance for Russia and China to underline their closer relationship, and for China to snub supplies of US liquefied natural gas that comes by ship.
India is buying Russian oil despite US President Donald Trump retaliating with 25 percent tariffs on imports, and China’s purchases of US liquefied natural gas are blocked by tariffs imposed as part of China’s trade dispute with the Trump administration trade. Meanwhile China has started taking LNG shipments from Russia’s Arctic-2 terminal, which has been the target of US and EU sanctions.
So the theatrics of the deal are clear.
“You’ve got this show of Russia, India, China saying, ‘you know what, we don’t care about your sanctions, we don’t care about your LNG,’” said Michal Meidan, head of China energy research at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
The announcement was “an absolutely perfect way ... to say: ‘Look, we’re not all talk, here’s an actual measure,’” said Annette Bohr, associate fellow in the Russia and Eurasia program at Chatham House in London.
But while the deal is “a step forward for Gazprom, it’s not a done deal. There’s no confirmed timeline, no definitive pricing agreement,” she said.
China’s hard bargain on prices
Discussions on the pipeline have moved slowly, largely because China has held out for low prices.
“At the moment, it’s entirely possible that Beijing is still only ready to commit to part of the pipeline, and at heavily discounted rates, which has in fact been the problem for a number of years,” Bohr said. “So Russia is, in effect, still subsidizing Chinese gas consumption.”
She added that “China is definitely in the driver’s seat” when it comes to energy deals.
The announcement underlines that China is the dominant partner, said Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.
China “has multiple other sources to import gas. So if Russia is ready to provide conditions that satisfy China’s demands, then it’s probably a green light,” he said. “But without that, it’s just a friendly reminder that Russia needs to accommodate some of Chinese demand. And it’s telling you that China has tremendous leverage, and has, in a way, the seniority in this relationship.”
Does China need another fossil fuel pipeline?
Given the global effort to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels, one good question is whether China needs another gas supplier, says the Oxford Energy Institute’s Meidan.
“It’s not clear that it really does need Power of Siberia 2,” she said, adding that there is “huge uncertainty about just how much demand China will have in the 2030s, even from Chinese analysts and Chinese institutions.”
China’s future demand is part of a complex equation involving a shift away from coal, which emits more carbon dioxide, as the swing fuel used to cover peaks in electricity demand that can’t be met by renewables such as wind or hydro power.
A faster move away from coal means more gas use over the short term, while a slower coal exit could increase gas consumption. Battery storage to cover demand peaks and nuclear power could also play a role.
“They might not necessarily use more gas if they do renewables and storage faster than anyone else, or if they find other ways where ... they use their hydro and their nuclear,” Meidan said.
For China, gas “is sort of a nice to have (but) it’s not a must-have,” she added.
 


What Bangladesh’s election means for India, China and Pakistan ties

Bangladesh Nationalist Party supporters gather for a rally ahead of the upcoming national election, in Sylhet on Jan. 22, 2026.
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What Bangladesh’s election means for India, China and Pakistan ties

  • Bangladeshis will vote on Feb. 12, almost two years after the 2024 student-led uprising
  • After nearly 2 years of tensions, experts expect a thaw with India under elected government

DHAKA: As Bangladesh prepares to hold its first elections since the 2024 ouster of Sheikh Hasina, its longest-serving prime minister, the outcome will define Dhaka’s relations with the most important regional powers — China, India, and Pakistan.

Nearly 128 million Bangladeshis will head to the polls on Feb. 12 to bring in new leadership after an 18-month rule of the current caretaker administration.

The interim government, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, took control following a student-led uprising that ended 15 years in power of Hasina and her Awami League party.

The two main parties out of the 51 competing for power are the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jamaat-e-Islami. The Awami League, which for decades has had close ties with India, was excluded from the election ballot over its role in the deadly crackdown on the 2024 student-led protests, in which 1,400 people were killed.

While Bangladesh’s relationship India has deteriorated since the fall of Hasina, who has been in self-exile in New Delhi, the period of diplomatic strain is expected to ease when the new government takes office.

“Whoever comes to power in Bangladesh, due to domestic pressure in the country, relationships with India need a resetting,” Humayun Kabir, former ambassador to the US, told Arab News.

“It’s anticipated that India will also engage with the new government, but they will protect their interests, and we also have to do the same. It’s most likely that the India-Bangladesh relationship will be normalized under the new, elected, government.”

Since 2024, India has suspended key transshipment access that allowed Bangladeshi exports to go via Indian ports and airports. It also put on hold most normal visa services for Bangladeshis, who were among its largest groups of medical tourists.

From Hasina’s heavy pro-India orientation, the interim government has tried to rebalance Bangladesh’s foreign policy toward the two other key regional players — China and Pakistan — who at the same time are India’s main rivals. 

If New Delhi regains its importance, it should not deal a blow to the newly expanded relations with Pakistan, with whom Bangladesh has recently increased exchanges, especially economic, and last month resumed direct flights — after a 14-year gap.

Since the relations have been expanded under the caretaker government, Prof. Delwar Hossain from the International Relations Department at Dhaka University forecast that they would only further improve, no matter who comes to power, and there is no likelihood of a sudden change.

“For Pakistan, any political coalition — whether BNP or Jamaat — will be positive. The BNP has a long history of having good relations with Pakistan during their rule ... Jamaat also has a strong and very positive influence in Pakistan,” he said.

“For Pakistan, the new regime or new government is not the issue. The issue is what the (India) policy of the new government would be and to what extent it would actually support Pakistan’s view.”

Both the BNP and Jamaat have repeatedly said they wanted friendly relations with India, and Hossain expected that they would, at the same time, continue the balanced approach introduced by the caretaker administration.

“India is a reality as a neighbor. At the same time, India is also showing interest in mending relations or adopting a more cooperative approach after the vote, with the government that will be elected ... I think there will be pragmatism from both sides,” he said.

“I don’t see there is a long-term threat to Bangladesh-India relations ... When China and Pakistan were trying to create a trilateral cooperative system or some kind of coalition — China, Bangladesh and Pakistan — we have seen that Bangladesh opted out. It seems that Bangladesh is going to continue its policy of maintaining a balance among these great powers.”

Bangladesh’s relations with China have not changed since the ouster of Hasina, whose government signed several economic agreements with Beijing. Yunus’s administration has continued this cooperation, and China was among the very few countries he officially visited during his term.

During the visit, he secured about $2.1 billion in Chinese investments, loans and grants, including funding for infrastructure like Mongla Port and a special economic zone in Chattogram — Bangladesh’s largest port. China has also eased visa rules for Bangladeshi businesspeople, medical travelers and tourists.

According to Munshi Faiz Ahmed, Bangladesh’s former ambassador to Beijing, China’s importance for Bangladesh cannot be substituted by any other country, especially as over the past few years it has emerged not only as its key investor, but also the largest trade partner.

In the fiscal year 2024-25, Bangladesh’s trade with China was over $21.3 billion, according to National Board of Revenue data. With India, it was about $11.5 billion.

The trade — especially import — dependence on Beijing started long before the regime change. In terms of trade volume, China overtook India already in 2018.

“Even when people thought that we had very close relations with India, our relations with China continued to grow in terms of trade and commerce ... Our trade with China has surpassed India’s, and China is a much bigger investor in Bangladesh’s development projects,” Ahmed said.

“Bangladesh will continue to cooperate with China for a long time to come because what China can provide, no other country can.”