Libyan parliament approves 2024 budget of $18.5 bln to its installed government
Libyan parliament approves 2024 budget of $18.5 bln to its installed government/node/2502396/middle-east
Libyan parliament approves 2024 budget of $18.5 bln to its installed government
A grab from a handout video release by the Libyan House of Representatives shows the parliament in session in the eastern city of Tobruk on February 10, 2022. (AFP)
Libyan parliament approves 2024 budget of $18.5 bln to its installed government
The budget is for the Benghazi-based government of Osama Hamad, who came to power in March 2023 and is allied with the military commander Khalifa Haftar, who controls the east and large parts of the southern region of Libya
Updated 01 May 2024
Reuters
BENGHAZI: Libya’s eastern-based parliament on Tuesday unanimously approved the 2024 budget for the government it installed of 90 billion Libyan dinars ($18.5 billion), excluding an item for development projects, three MPs told Reuters.
The budget is for the Benghazi-based government of Osama Hamad, who came to power in March 2023 and is allied with the military commander Khalifa Haftar, who controls the east and large parts of the southern region of Libya.
Libya’s separate Tripoli-based Government of National Unity is headed by interim Prime Minister Abdulhamid Al-Dbeibah, who was installed through a UN-backed process in 2021.
House of Representatives (HoR) member Aisha Tublqi said the item for development projects was excluded from the budget because “the government demanded 30 billion LYD for three years but the parliament wants more details for the projects for approval.”
It is unclear if the Tripoli-based Central Bank of Libya (CBL) governor, Sadiq Kabir, will hand over the money to the government of Hamad.
CBL is the only internationally recognized depository for Libyan oil revenues, the country’s vital economic income.
“We accepted and approved the budget with taking into account some notes,” said HoR member Abdulmenam Alorafi.
In February, Kabir called for a new unified government and a national budget in an apparent challenge to his former ally Dbeibah over government spending, urging for an end to what he described as parallel spending “from unknown sources.”
Dbeibah, who is no longer recognized by HoR, has vowed not to cede power to a new government without national elections.
A political process to resolve more than a decade of conflict in Libya has been stalled since an election scheduled for December 2021 collapsed amid disputes over the eligibility of the main candidates and disputes over elections laws.
The dispute over control of government and state revenue, and over a political solution to resolve years of violent chaos, threatens to launch Libya back into administrative partition and war.
In his briefing to the Security Council this month, UN special envoy Abdullah Bathily urged Libyan authorities “to promptly agree on a national budget and decisively address significant deficiencies.”
Bathily, who had tendered his resignation to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, said, “The economic situation in Libya is becoming severely strained, amidst warnings from the Central Bank of Libya of an impending liquidity crisis.”
Israel’s Somaliland gambit: what’s at risk for the region?
Somaliland’s strategic location near the Bab Al-Mandab raises fears an Israeli security presence could turn the Red Sea into a powder keg
Critics argue the decision revives Israel’s “periphery” strategy, encouraging fragmentation of Arab and Muslim states for strategic advantage
Updated 7 sec ago
Arab News
RIYADH: It perhaps comes as no surprise to seasoned regional observers that Israel has become the first and only UN member state to formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign nation.
On Dec. 26, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar signed a joint declaration of mutual recognition alongside Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi.
For a region that has existed in a state of diplomatic limbo since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, this development is, as Abdullahi described it, “a historic moment.” But beneath the surface lies a calculated and high-stakes geopolitical gamble.
While several nations, including the UK, Ethiopia, Turkiye, and the UAE, have maintained liaison offices in the capital of Hargeisa, none had been willing to cross the Rubicon of formal state recognition.
Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, assisted by Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, signs the document formally recognizing Somalia's breakaway Somaliland region on Dec. 26, 2025. (AFP)
Israel’s decision to break this decades-long international consensus is a deliberate departure from the status quo.
By taking this step, Israel has positioned itself as the primary benefactor of a state that has long sought a seat at the international table. As Dya-Eddine Said Bamakhrama, the ambassador of Djibouti to Saudi Arabia, told Arab News, such a move is deeply disruptive.
“A unilateral declaration of separation is neither a purely legal nor an isolated political act. Rather, it carries profound structural consequences, foremost among them the deepening of internal divisions and rivalries among citizens of the same nation, the erosion of the social and political fabric of the state, and the opening of the door to protracted conflicts,” he said.
Critics argue that Israel has long lobbied for the further carving up of the region under various guises.
This recognition of Somaliland is seen by many in the Arab world as a continuation of a strategy aimed at weakening centralized Arab and Muslim states by encouraging peripheral secessionist movements.
Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi. (AFP file photo)
In the Somali context, this path is perceived not as a humanitarian gesture, but as a method to undermine the national understandings reached within the framework of a federal Somalia.
According to Ambassador Bamakhrama, the international community has historically resisted such moves to prioritize regional stability over “separatist tendencies whose dangers and high costs history has repeatedly demonstrated.”
By ignoring this precedent, Israel is accused of using recognition as a tool to fragment regional cohesion.
In the past, Israel has often framed its support for non-state actors or separatist groups under the pretext of protecting vulnerable minorities — such as the Druze in the Levant or Maronites in Lebanon.
This “Periphery Doctrine” served a dual purpose: it created regional allies and supported Israel’s own claim of being a Jewish state by validating the idea of ethnic or religious self-determination.
However, in the case of Somaliland, the gloves are off completely. The argument here is not about protecting a religious minority, as Somaliland is a staunchly Muslim-majority territory. Instead, the rationale is nakedly geopolitical.
Israel appears to be seeking strategic depth in a region where it has historically been isolated. Netanyahu explicitly linked the move to “the spirit of the Abraham Accords,” signaling that the primary drivers are security, maritime control, and intelligence gathering rather than the internal demographics of the Horn of Africa.
The first major win for Israel in this maneuver is the expansion of its diplomatic orbit. It could be argued that the refusal of the federal government in Mogadishu to join the Abraham Accords was an artificial barrier.
The evidence for this claim, from the Israeli perspective, is that Somaliland — a territory with a population of nearly six million and its own functioning democratic institutions — was eager to join.
Abdullahi said Somaliland would join the Abraham Accords as a “step toward regional and global peace.” Yet, this peace comes with a clear quid pro quo — formal recognition.
Residents wave Somaliland flags as they gather in downtown Hargeisa on December 26, 2025, to celebrate Israel's announcement recognizing Somaliland's statehood. (AFP)
Israel can now argue that the “Somaliland model” proves that many other Arab and Muslim entities are willing to normalize relations if their specific political or territorial interests are met.
This challenges the unified stance of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which maintain that normalization must be tied to the resolution of the Palestinian conflict.
The second major gain for Israel is the potential for a military presence in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland’s strategic position on the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, makes it a prime location for monitoring maritime traffic.
This is a ticking time bomb given that just across the narrow sea lies Yemen, where the Houthi movement — whose slogan includes “Death to Israel” — controls significant territory.
Israel may claim that a military or intelligence presence in Somaliland will boost regional security by countering Houthi threats to shipping. However, regional neighbors fear it will likely inflame tensions.
Ambassador Bamakhrama warned that an Israeli military presence would “effectively turn the region into a powder keg.”
Ambassador Dya-Eddine Said Bamakhrama, Djibouti's envoy to Saudi Arabia. (Supplied)
“Should Israel proceed with establishing a military base in a geopolitically sensitive location... such a move would be perceived in Tel Aviv as a strategic gain directed against the Arab states bordering the Red Sea — namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, and Djibouti,” he said.
The Red Sea is a “vital international maritime corridor,” and any shift in its geopolitical balance would have “repercussions extending far beyond the region,” he added.
The recognition is also a clear violation of international law and the principle of territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter.
While proponents point to exceptions like South Sudan or Kosovo, those cases involved vastly different circumstances, including prolonged genocidal conflicts and extensive UN-led transitions.
In contrast, the African Union has been firm that Somaliland remains an integral part of Somalia.
The backlash has been swift and severe. The Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the OIC have all decried the move. Even US President Donald Trump, despite his role in the original Abraham Accords, has not endorsed Israel’s decision.
When asked whether Washington would follow suit, Trump replied with a blunt “no,” adding, “Does anyone know what Somaliland is, really?”
This lack of support from Washington highlights the isolation of Israel’s position. The OIC and the foreign ministers of 21 countries have issued a joint statement warning of “serious repercussions” and rejecting any potential link between this recognition and reported plans to displace Palestinians from Gaza to the African region.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland appears to be a calculated gamble to trade diplomatic norms for strategic advantage.
While Hargeisa celebrates a long-awaited milestone, the rest of the world sees a dangerous precedent that threatens to destabilize one of the world’s most volatile corridors.
As Ambassador Bamakhrama says, the establishment of such ties “would render (Israel) the first and only state to break with the international consensus” — a move that prioritizes “narrow strategic calculations” over the stability of the international system.