Iraq’s enemies fire a warning shot with Hisham Al-Hashimi’s murder

Mourners carry the coffin of slain Iraqi jihadism expert Hisham al-Hashemi, who was shot dead yesterday outside his house in the Iraqi capital, during his funeral in Baghdad’s Zayouna district on July 7, 2020. (AFP)
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Updated 12 August 2020
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Iraq’s enemies fire a warning shot with Hisham Al-Hashimi’s murder

  • Gunshots that killed security analyst on Monday reverberate across the Arab world
  • Use of murder to scare critics viewed as a familiar tactic of Middle East terror groups

ERBIL, IRAQI KURDISTAN: In an act that shocked the Arab world late on Monday, unidentified gunmen on a motorcycle shot and killed Hisham Al-Hashimi, a leading Iraqi expert on Daesh and other armed groups. As with so many unsolved murders of prominent public personalities in Iraq since 2003, there is no dearth of suspects. The big question is what action Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi can afford to take under the circumstances.

The 47-year-old Al-Hashimi was a well-respected Iraqi academic and political analyst. His expertise on Daesh earned him the position of adviser to the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. After the destruction of Daesh’s self-styled caliphate in 2018, he shifted his focus to the workings of the Hashd Al-Shaabi (or Popular Mobilization Forces) units that participated in the anti-Daesh campaign.

Al-Hashimi had expressed fears in recent weeks that Iranian-backed constituents of Hashd had him in their crosshairs. A medical source at the hospital where he was taken after Monday’s shooting said he had suffered “bullet wounds in several body parts.”

Iraq witnessed a spate of deadly attacks on intellectuals, academics and moderate politicians at the height of the insurgency. More than 500 people have been killed since protests erupted in Oct. 2019, demanding an end to corruption and Iran’s overarching influence. But analysts believe that with Al-Hashimi’s killing, a loud warning shot has been fired across Al-Kadhimi’s bow.

“The assassination is intended to signal militia displeasure with Al-Kadhimi and his inner circle,” said Michael Knights, a noted Iraq analyst and Lafer Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

“They are saying that there is a cost to the Al-Kadhimi team for arresting militia members and disrupting militia money-making enterprises,” he added.

The use of murder to scare critics is of course not something new to terror groups in the Middle East.

The assassination of Lebanon’s former prime minister Rafik Hariri and the subsequent attacks that killed or maimed critics of Syria and Hezbollah in the 2000s are prominent examples of this.

Late last month, Al-Kadhimi had 14 members of the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah arrested in Baghdad when the group was preparing to carry out a rocket attack on bases hosting US troops.

(Video: Protesters aiming their anger at Kataib Hezbollah, who they blame for orchestrating the Al-Hashimi killing. Twitter)

Although the militants were quickly released, the action suggested that the new government was prepared to take a firm stance against rogue Hashd elements.

Knights’ view is echoed by Joel Wing, author of the Musings on Iraq blog, who says Kataib Hezbollah is a prime suspect in Al-Hashimi’s murder.

“The message was a simple one,” he told Arab News. “Those who criticize their activities will be threatened like Al-Hashimi was, and can be killed with impunity.”

Wing says groups such as the Kataib feel they are part of the state now and “therefore have free rein to kill protesters, critics and anyone else they feel fit to execute, because no one has stopped them before.”

The US-led invasion of 2003 brought the turbulent Saddam Hussein era to an abrupt end, but new troubles cropped up in the form of insurgency, terrorism, sectarian politics and finally Daesh. Today Iraq is torn between a pro-Iran camp, which wants to get rid of the last vestiges of US military presence, and nationalists, who resent the pervasive influence of Tehran in their country’s affairs.

Lawk Ghafuri, an Iraq analyst and journalist for the Erbil-based Kurdish media outlet Rudaw, views Al-Hashimi’s assassination as a “clear message to all writers and researchers in Iraq that there are red lines, and if you cross them, you’ll be murdered.”

He said: “This is a huge step backward for freedom of expression and a free press in Iraq.”

According to Ghafuri, if the assassins are revealed as Iran-backed members of Hashd, Al-Kadhimi’s promise of action might prove difficult to fulfill, since he already faces pressure from the same elements over the arrest of the Kataib militants.

In his final commentaries, Al-Hashimi had rebuked the Hashd, among other groups, for operating outside of the control of the state, a criticism they are extremely sensitive to, Ghafuri said.

He added: “Al-Hashimi had outlined in detail the new structure, difficulties, challenges, and internal issues within the Hashd Al-Shaabi. He described the way they are operating, and he also illustrated the divisions in Hashd, where some are loyal to Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani and others loyal to Iran.”

Regardless of Al-Kadhimi’s next course of action, Ghafuri warns that Iraqis must be prepared for more chaos going forward.

The least we can do is to expose these criminals and bring justice to ensure that security and peace prevails for our country.

Barham Salih, President of Iraq

“If you stay silent, the rule of law will be in a bad situation. But if you implement the rule of law, the Iranian-backed militias will cause trouble for you,” he said.

However, as Knights says, Al-Hashimi enjoyed a lot of respect among Iraqis and was a supporter of last year’s anti-government protests. As a result of this, his murder could prove a step too far for Iranian-backed Hashd fighters.

“The militias killed a popular supporter of the protest movement and a recognizable face of Iraqi academia when they targeted Al-Hashimi,” he said, adding that “the action may prove counterproductive for the militias."

Wing said that, while Al-Hashimi’s death has led to an international outcry, “it is still a dangerous game for the prime minister to respond.”

At the most, Al-Kadhimi “might be able to pull off an arrest of a few members, if the authorities can find direct evidence in the assassination,” he said.

“Anything else could bring a wave of protests in the Green Zone, as happened after the raid on Kataib Hezbollah. It could bring even more rocket attacks on facilities that host Americans in defiance of his demands that they stop, and even the fall of his government if the ‘Fatah List’ decides he has gone too far,” he added.

Wing was referring to a powerful bloc in parliament that vigorously defends Iran’s interests and policies in Iraq.

Wing does not believe Al-Hashimi’s murder was a direct response to the arrest of Kataib members, but sees it as “another poke in Al-Kadhimi’s eye, saying they don’t believe he has the power to stop their activities.”

He said: “When the Hashd were made part of the security forces, praised for their war against Daesh, and their crimes were actively covered up, it gave them the sense that they could do what they wanted. And this is just the latest example.”

He added: “If they could get away with destroying part of Tikrit and the surrounding towns after the city was retaken, kidnapping and murdering hundreds of men during operations in Anbar, and displacing thousands of people during the war, who is going to stop them for killing one analyst?”

Still, Knights believes Al-Kadhimi’s people will not back down because of the July 6 assassination, although they may move more cautiously now.

“When intelligence suggests future militia attacks or justifies arrest operations, they will probably detain more militia fighters,” he said, adding: “The tit-for-tat pattern has begun, but Al-Kadhimi is not easy to intimidate.”

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Of strikes and succession: How Iran’s ‘mosaic regime’ endures after Khamenei’s killing

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Of strikes and succession: How Iran’s ‘mosaic regime’ endures after Khamenei’s killing

  • Experts say Iran’s dispersed power structure was built to withstand leadership decapitation and prolonged confrontation
  • Succession uncertainty persists, but entrenched institutions and security networks keep the regime functioning

LONDON: Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, was killed on Saturday along with much of the Iranian regime’s senior civilian and military leadership. But, thanks to Iran’s “mosaic” leadership structure, the regime itself is far from dead.

When Iran’s first supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, died of natural causes in 1989, his successor, Khamenei, took office the very next day.

Now Khamenei is dead, killed along with dozens of members of his family and other senior Iranian leaders in a series of US and Israeli attacks on targets across Tehran. Days later, the succession question remains unanswered.

But this, experts suggest, does not mean that Iran is drifting rudderless in a power vacuum — or that cutting off the head will kill the snake.

“The Iranian regime is a system that was built to last,” said Dr Burcu Ozcelik, a senior research fellow at the London-based Royal United Services Institute.

“It has constitutional provisions in place and deep contingency planning, with four or five names for each key role, and so there was a high level of preparedness for a leadership decapitation campaign.”

Contingencies for just such an eventuality, which were first put in place at the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, “were stepped up after Oct. 7, 2023, when the Iranians assessed that there would be a long-lasting confrontation with Israel.

“And although the attacks that followed didn’t lead to a regional confrontation of the sort we are seeing now, the Iranians have been long preparing for this.”

This combination of images shows (clockwise, from top left) smoke rising from a building hit in  an Iranian missile and drone attack on March 1, flames and a black plume of smoke rising from a warehouse hit in a drone strike in Sharjah, UAE on March 1, a buildijg burning in Manama Bahrain. after a drone strike, and cars destroyed during a missile barrage in n Bnei Brak, Israel, on March 3, 2026. (REUTERS plhotos)

This is what Robert Pape, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, specializing in international security affairs, characterized this week as “the mosaic regime.”

“Iran anticipated decapitation long before (the US operation) Epic Fury began,” he wrote on Substack.

“Under its ‘mosaic’ leadership defense doctrine, authority is dispersed into semi-autonomous cells across military, security, and political domains. Redundancy substitutes for hierarchy.”

Pape added: “Airpower kills leaders; it does not easily kill distributed function.”

This was reflected in comments from Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of Iran’s parliament, who said the regime had “prepared for these moments” and had “planned for all scenarios.”

Indeed, despite multiple attacks by Israel and the US on senior civilian and military leadership, the drones and missiles keep coming across the Arabian Gulf.

The Iranian state “can be best described as polymorphous,” said Dr. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, professor of global thought and comparative philosophies at the Department of Politics and International Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London.

Western media, he added, “has a skewed understanding of the political dynamics in Iran and there is also a political agenda behind the misrepresentations.

“The tragedy is that this false reality informs decisions. This is why we are facing this horrific war. Bad, ideological knowledge created bad, impulsive decisions.”

Within Iran, he said, “there are several institutions that compete with each other and are anchored quite firmly in networks permeating society.”

At the heart of the system is the supreme leader, who supervises the other branches of government, including elected bodies such as the presidency, the Assembly of Experts and the parliament.

“And then there are the security layers, the military (Artesh), the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and their underbellies — for instance the Basij units with their representation in every university, municipal council, large organizations and even the smallest villages of the country.”

In addition, “there are theological power centers in the Shiite-Islamic seminaries surrounding the holy sites in Mashhad and Qom.

“It is this polymorphic structure that explains why the Israel-US assassination campaign hasn’t disrupted the ability of Iran to govern the country, certainly for now.”

Sooner or later a new supreme leader will have to be appointed. The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran lays down a precise process.

In theory, a serving leader designates his preferred successor, whose appointment after his death is subject to approval by the Assembly of Experts — a panel of 88 Islamic jurists.

The Assembly of Experts building in Qom was itself struck on Tuesday as regime clerics were gathering to elect a new supreme leader, according to local media. At the time of writing, it was not immediately clear who was inside. If confirmed, the attack is likely to delay the process further.

“I don’t know that a date has been set,” said RUSI’s Ozcelik. “I think the language being used is that it would be ‘in the near future.’

“But there will be security concerns around a physical meeting of key clerical figures that would certainly be on the radar of American and Israeli intelligence and, given the circumstances, I think the regime can continue to justify not a delay but a considered longer timeline.”

This combination of images taken from a video circulated on social media shows the damaged building of the Assembly of Experts in Qom, Iran, after it was struck. (Social media)

It remains unknown who, if anyone, Khamenei had designated as his successor. If he had not, it might fall to the Assembly of Experts to pick someone.

The field of candidates is larger than it once was. Under the original terms of the constitution, framed after the 1979 revolution, a supreme leader had to be chosen from among the pool of Grand Ayatollahs.

That changed when Ayatollah Khomeini’s original choice to succeed him, Grand Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, fell out of favor and was dropped from the succession after he began to publicly criticize some of the violent excesses of the regime.

The constitution was then amended, opening up the field of succession beyond the limited cohort of Grand Ayatollahs, which allowed Khomeini to designate Khamenei as his successor. The Assembly of Experts endorsed his choice on June 3, 1989.

In the meantime, Iran is being run, as dictated by the constitution, by a three-man council. The council, which was formed on Sunday, consists of President Masoud Pezeshkian, judiciary chief Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, and senior cleric Alireza Arafi.

In theory, these are the men that US President Donald Trump would be talking to should the US decide to reopen negotiations. However, Tuesday’s attack on the Presidential Office suggests no one in the regime is safe.

“I don’t know if these three are actually targets,” said Ozcelik. “Although I think that would be consistent with what we’ve seen from the Israelis’ point of view.

“But I’m not sure how helpful it would be to take out a figure such as President Pezeshkian, who in Iranian terms is a moderate, and a potential point of contact with whom Trump and his administration could have talks going forward.

“And whenever this concludes, there will need to be someone in Tehran who is able to pick up the phone when Trump calls.”

Who that might be right now is as much a question of who remains alive as anything else, said Mona Yacoubian, director and senior adviser of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

“I’m going to guess that the US would engage with those with whom they’ve engaged in the past, whether it’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, or possibly Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council,” she said.

“Those are, I think, the two key people I would highlight, which doesn’t necessarily overlap with that Transitional Council.”

That said, as the death toll among Iranian leaders continues to mount, it could be that no one is now safe.

“And the message that sends is one of regime change,” said Yacoubian. “That’s what the US and Israel in particular have been focused on.

“We have heard President Trump, in one of his many different interactions with various members of the media, note that the US had identified successors, and that those successors had been killed.

“I think that about sums it up, and that’s why I think that any public naming of a supreme leader may not come for some time.”

She added: “In some ways, it’s not clear how important that is at this point. I think the focus in Iran right now is very much on maintaining regime cohesion, such as it exists.

“The military and security circles have long been engaged on these questions and have been thinking through this type of scenario planning.

“So I don’t know how significant it is that we have yet to hear of a new supreme leader being named because these other centers of power, which have long existed in Iran, were likely already planning for a post-Khamenei transition well before this current conflict started, and they are clearly still acting and working, perhaps in a decentralized way.

“So yes, there have been decapitation strikes. But what that actually means in terms of how the system in Iran is operating is unclear.”