What Israel’s Jordan Valley annexation plan means for a Palestinian state

Palestinians say Netanyahu’s plan will have serious implications for a Palestinian state’s viability with regard to water, agriculture, natural resources and tourism. (AFP)
Updated 13 September 2019
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What Israel’s Jordan Valley annexation plan means for a Palestinian state

  • Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed to carry out his threat if he wins the Sept 17 election
  • The annexation plan will destroy all hope of a viable state, say Palestinian officials

JERUSALEM: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s threat to annex the Jordan Valley and the northern Dead Sea area of the occupied West Bank has left Palestinian development planners in disarray.

The threat, if implemented, will rule out the two-state solution as a political concept, and have serious implications for a Palestinian state’s viability with regard to water, agriculture, natural resources and tourism.

Netanyahu vowed on Tuesday that if he is returned to office in the Sept. 17 election, he will “immediately” extend “Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea.” The Jordan Valley accounts for about one-third of the West Bank.

Opinion polls indicate that Netanyahu’s Likud party is neck and neck with the opposition Blue and White party, and may struggle to form a coalition. His controversial pledge could get him the backing of right-wing parties.

Jad Ishaq, director general of the Applied Research Institute, said the land that Netanyahu referred to in his televised speech accounts for a big chunk of the West Bank.

“From the standpoint of Palestinian agriculture, this is the breadbasket,” Ishaq told Arab News.

Around 65,000 Palestinians and 11,000 Israeli settlers live in the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea area, according to Israeli human rights group B’Tselem.

The main Palestinian city is Jericho, with about 28 villages and smaller communities.

Ishaq, who advises Palestinian officials, said Netanyahu’s threat, if carried out, would kill off the possibility of a viable Palestinian state.

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“Simply put, this will deny us our water rights in the Jordan River, and limit our potential for mining
our national resources and for recreational tourism in the Dead Sea,” he added. Ishaq put the potential annual income from these activities at an estimated $2 billion.

“This Israeli annexation plan stunts the sustainability, contiguity and integrity of a future Palestinian state,” he said. 

“The plan leaves it without any control over the borders with Jordan, and converts Palestinian areas into an entity comprising cantons that won’t survive.”

Depriving Palestinians of the right to derive financial advantage from Dead Sea minerals would amount to a major economic blow, Ishaq said.

“At present, Dead Sea minerals are being divided between Jordan and Israel. Each country earns an average of $1.5 billion annually,” he added.

Sani Meo, publisher of the tourism monthly This Week in Palestine, said access to the Dead Sea and the Jordan Valley is vital for the development of Palestinian tourism. “There’s huge potential for tourism here that would be destroyed,” he told Arab News.

Meo expressed concern that the absence of internal tourism will exacerbate existing problems.

“The only opening for us is to the east, and now that’s being blocked,” he said. “We can’t get to Gaza and we can’t travel to Lebanon. Every time we discover a strategic opening, they (the Israelis) shut it.”

Netanyahu’s threat “will cause more tensions. This is short-sightedness on the part of the Israelis,” Meo said.

“By destroying the small signs of hope, the Israelis are building up more pressure inside a veritable pressure cooker. They’re unable to understand that it will eventually bring about an explosion.”

Israel captured the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, from Jordan in the 1967 war. More than 2.5 million Palestinians now live there, in addition to nearly 700,000 Jewish settlers.


Iraq’s political future in limbo as factions vie for power

Updated 21 December 2025
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Iraq’s political future in limbo as factions vie for power

  • The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years

BAGHDAD: Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.
The November election didn’t produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations.
The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.
Uncertain prospects
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani’s party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.
While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support Al-Sudani’s reelection bid.
“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn’t have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.
Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give Al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”
The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri Al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.
Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Al-Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”
He said that the figure selected as Iraq’s prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani.
Al-Sudani in a bind
In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.
The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by Al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.
Al-Sudani’s results, while strong, don’t allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.
Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when Al-Sudani’s government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthi rebels — Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.
The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.
Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”
“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.
Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.
Other political actors
Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.
The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.
By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.
Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.
The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.
Washington steps in
The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.
They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90 percent of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.
But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the Daesh group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.
It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.
The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.
Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.
“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.