We know well who killed the top Hezbollah commander, Imad Mughniyeh on Feb 12 in Damascus.
While in the US media, only journalists like Seymour Hersh will have the nerve to point out the obvious, the Israeli media has not shied away from evidence of the Israeli intelligence’s involvement in this well-calculated assassination.
A major Israeli daily newspaper Maariv shared the views of many others when it concluded that: “Officially, Israel yesterday denied responsibility for the killing. But experts say the brilliant execution of the attack was characteristic of the Mossad.”
Donald Rumsfeld is no longer in public eye but his wisdom lives on. “We also know there are known unknowns,” he once told perplexed reporters. Precisely, the unknown known is that the Israeli Mossad killed Mughniyeh, and killed him for specific political reasons, at a well-chosen time and place.
Let’s first look at the timing.
President Bush’s second term in office will expire in one year. For the president who has unconditionally rubber-stamped Israeli policies, one year is not enough to set long-term goals, but it’s enough to ignite chaos.
“If you want chaos, then we welcome chaos. If you want war, then we welcome war. We have no problem with weapons or with rockets which we will launch on you.” These were the words of Lebanon’s MP Walid Jumblatt of the ruling March 14 Coalition, directed at the Hezbollah-led opposition a few days prior to the third year anniversary of Rafik Hariri’s assassination. Considering the military strength of Hezbollah within Lebanon, it isn’t difficult to guess where the MP’s rockets would come from.
Indeed, the internal disunity and open hostility all point at the readiness of Lebanon to descend into chaos. This is good news for Israel and the Bush administration. A civil war could achieve what Israel’s botched, illegal war of 2006 could not.
The 34-day war, celebrated by Hezbollah as a victory, was a massive setback to Israel’s regional designs and to those who wanted Hezbollah removed from the country’s political equation. The war backfired, achieving the exact opposite: Hezbollah emerged triumphant. How could Olmert correct the mistakes of war without leading another? And what a better timing for war if not at a moment when Hezbollah and its rivals in Lebanon are engaged in one of their own?
But the assassination of a high profiled person like Mughniyeh was not merely an opportunity to boast over a classic Mossad operation. It was a major ingredient in a larger scheme, the end result of which is maybe war with both Lebanon and Syria — with the hope of getting Iran involved.
The US’ National Intelligence Estimate concluded that Iran is no longer in the nuclear weapons manufacturing business. But for Israel, “absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence” — another Rumsfeld quote. Fearing that unchecked Iran could dominate the region, Israel, with Bush’s green light, is now ready for escalation.
Israel officials and pundits are building a case for a confrontation with Iran. Israel, however, is neither capable, nor willing to face Iran in a conventional war. But, going after Hezbollah could be disastrous, thus the need for a new tactic. Last September, Israel experimented, once again, with the idea of bombing Syria. What Israel wants is an easy victory over Syria, which will block Iranian military supplies to Hezbollah, and deny Palestinian opposition parties a safe heaven in Damascus, the last Arab capital willing to provide them with a political platform. Facing an internal challenge at home and without Iran’s help, Hezbollah cannot withstand a fight on two fronts.
For Israel’s scheme to succeed, the internal conflict in Lebanon must escalate, a mission entrusted to the “mysterious” car bombings that have been blamed squarely on Syria and its Lebanese allies.
By gloating, yet without revealing much about the assassination of Mughniyeh, Israeli commentators might have lost sight of the great gamble of their government. Hezbollah’s response, articulated by their leader Hassan Nasrallah, was a vow for an “open” war. The group will most likely avoid border clashes, and take the war against Israel to the international arena, like Israel has. And like Israel, it may gloat but officially refrain from sponsoring whatever operations it carries out.
The course of future events is now more predictable, although whether such tit-for-tat behavior will work in Israel’s favor remains in the realm of “unknown unknowns”. Maybe Rumsfeld had it right after all.
