Why the journey home remains uncertain for Syria’s displaced

After opposition groups seized control of Syria’s major cities, thousands displaced to neighboring countries by the 13-year civil war have begun returning to their homes. (AFP)
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Updated 27 January 2025
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Why the journey home remains uncertain for Syria’s displaced

  • Fragile security, a shattered economy, and a war-torn landscape are key barriers to the return of displaced families
  • Despite tens of thousands returning since Assad’s fall, sectarian tensions and acts of vengeance fuel concerns

LONDON: When Bashar Assad’s regime suddenly collapsed early last month, displaced families scattered across the region felt a wave of relief, confident they could at last safely return to ancestral homes abandoned during Syria’s 13-year civil war.

However, with tens of thousands having once again packed up their lives in their adopted communities to make the journey home, many are returning to find their once-familiar neighborhoods disfigured by war and demographic changes.

Within the first month after Assad’s ouster on Dec. 8, more than 125,000 of the 5.5 million Syrians displaced to neighboring countries since 2011 returned to their war-torn homeland, according to UN figures.

The International Organization for Migration announced earlier this month that it is increasing its donor appeal for Syria to $73.2 million to assist more than 1.1 million people over the next six months.




“The country still lacks critical components — security, services, and infrastructure — all of which are vital for families to return.” (AFP)

These developments highlight the immense challenges associated with the mass repatriation of displaced persons, despite the assistance of host governments in Lebanon, Turkiye, and Jordan.

“Returning to Syria once felt like a far-fetched dream. None of us believed we could go back anytime soon,” Loujein Haj Youssef, a Paris-based Syrian journalist, told Arab News.

But even after Assad’s downfall, “the country still lacks critical components — security, services, and infrastructure — all of which are vital for families to return.”

Syria’s civil war created one of the world’s largest displacement crises since the Second World War, forcing more than 14 million people to flee to neighboring nations and beyond.

Despite harsh conditions and even abuses in host countries, many were hesitant to return, fearing arrest, persecution, or forced military service. After Assad’s downfall, however, thousands flocked to the borders.

For many others, security remains a major concern. Rema Jamous Imseis, the UN refugee agency’s director for the Middle East and North Africa, described the situation in Syria as “fluid and far from stable.”

She told a press briefing on Dec. 17: “In the past three weeks, we have seen more than 1 million people forced to flee their homes, thousands of Syrian refugees returning, and thousands of Syrians fleeing the country.”




90 percent of Syria’s population living below the poverty line. (AFP)

Noting that the change of regime does not necessarily signal an end to Syria’s humanitarian emergency, she stressed that “Syrians inside and outside the country still need protection and support.”

The Syrian opposition offensive launched on Nov. 27, which led to Assad’s sudden downfall, has triggered a new wave of displacement. By Dec. 12, it had forced about 1.1 million people from their homes, according to the UN’s humanitarian agency OCHA.

In recent days, the central governorate of Homs has seen an increase in armed attacks. On Jan. 24, “unidentified gunmen wearing military uniforms” executed 13 people and arrested 53 others in a rural district, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported.

Amid this turmoil, journalist Haj Youssef warned that fear of “another civil war” is among the main hindrances to the return of displaced Syrians.

“The current divisions, the absence of proper institutions and laws, and reprisals — particularly by groups perceived to be affiliated with the current administration — create deep uncertainty,” she told Arab News.

“This is especially troubling amid the recent sectarian tensions in areas like Homs and Latakia,” she added, warning that “if the chaos persists, many fear that it could lead to a renewed civil war.”




A fear of “another civil war” is among the main hindrances to the return of displaced Syrians. (AFP)

The international community has voiced concerns about the wellbeing of Syria’s various sects after Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham took control of Syria’s capital, Damascus.

Human Rights Watch highlighted in a recent statement that the armed groups that led the 12-day offensive, including HTS and factions of the Syrian National Army, were implicated in human rights abuses and war crimes.

In response, HTS said that the rights and freedoms of religious and ethnic minorities would be protected, the BBC reported.

Interim Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan Al-Shaibani said at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, last week that “no one should be punished because of their origin, social or religious background, or affiliation with certain groups.”

However, since early 2025, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights has documented 88 murders across 10 governorates that are classified as retaliatory actions, and a further 185 killings, of which 106 were the result of sectarian affiliations.




For many displaced Syrians, security remains a major concern. (AFP)

These crimes include three in Damascus, 14 in Rif Dimashq, 89 in Homs, 45 in Hama, 15 in Latakia, four in Aleppo, nine in Tartus, four in Idlib, one in Sweida, and one in Deir Ezzor.

“There are fears that the persistence of this chaos may be a deliberate decision by the new administration, which is deeply concerning,” Haj Youssef said.

The EU has voiced similar concerns. Earlier this month, the bloc’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, said sanctions could be lifted if Syria’s new rulers took steps to form an inclusive government that protects minorities.

Western sanctions have crippled Syria’s economy, and the nationwide collapse, compounded by widespread destruction, poses a major hurdle to the return of displaced Syrians.

INNUMBERS

• 125k Refugees returned to Syria since Dec. 8.

• 486k IDPs returned to areas of origin.

• 664k People newly displaced across Syria.

(Source: UN)


“One of the main challenges preventing refugees from returning today is the country’s shattered economy,” said Haj Youssef. “There must be viable prospects for livelihoods to encourage their return.”

Over a decade of civil war and strict Western sanctions, alongside other factors, have taken a toll on Syria’s economy. From 2010 to 2021, its gross domestic product shrank by more than half, according to official Syrian data cited by the World Bank in spring 2024.




Syria’s civil war created one of the world’s largest displacement crises since the Second World War. (AFP)


Those returning to war-torn areas, such as Yarmouk Camp in Damascus, were met with piles of rubble and the ashes of what had once been their homes. Stripped of the essentials for life, these areas had been left uninhabitable.

“The biggest obstacle is returning to homes which were totally destroyed,” Fadi Al-Dairi, co-founder and regional director of the Syrian-British charity Hand in Hand for Aid and Development, told Arab News.

Rebuilding Syria is estimated to cost between $250 billion and $400 billion, according to media reports.

Recalling his visit to newly accessible areas, Al-Dairi said: “When I visited Yarmouk Camp, Darayya, the Al-Razi Fields, and several areas around Damascus, they were totally flattened. They were demolished. They are unrecognizable.

“So, we’re looking at housing, lands, and property rights, which are lost, and this will need the government to interfere.”

Al-Dairi said many displaced Syrians were keen to return but “are quite reluctant to rehabilitate their homes” as “it does cost money.” He highlighted that rehabilitating a home could cost between $3,000 to $20,000.

“The majority of families say, ‘Why do I have to do it?’ There’s going to be reconstruction. They assume reconstruction will include private properties. But from our experience, the NGOs will only rehabilitate homes.”

With 90 percent of Syria’s population living below the poverty line, public services in former regime-controlled areas in poor condition, and soaring unemployment rates, humanitarian needs remain overwhelming.




Since early 2025, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights has documented 88 murders across 10 governorates that are classified as retaliatory actions, and a further 185 killings, of which 106 were the result of sectarian affiliations. (AFP)


Following a recent visit to Syria, Ted Chaiban, deputy executive director for humanitarian action and supply operations at the UN children’s agency, UNICEF, said that “an estimated 16.7 million people, including 7.5 million children need humanitarian assistance.

“Almost 40 percent of hospitals and health facilities are partly or completely non-functional,” he added in a statement on Jan. 23. “Nearly 13.6 million people require improved water, sanitation, and hygiene services.”

HIHFAD’s Al-Dairi said that “in previously regime-held areas, the hospitals, schools, and various services were totally neglected … and we also have a lack of jobs.”

Collaborating with the interim government to address these diverse needs is another challenge.

“The government is a transitional government. It cannot pay wages,” Al-Dairi said. “We have a difference in the wages between various areas, between those previously held by the regime and those in the northwest.”

He highlighted concerns about “people leaving Damascus, for example, to come to Idlib for job opportunities.




The Syrian opposition offensive launched on Nov. 27, which led to Assad’s sudden downfall. (AFP)

“When we talk about Idlib, we have electricity here 24/7, but in Damascus, you’re talking about two hours a day — maximum one hour every 11 hours. It’s not enough.

“In areas previously held by the Assad regime, there are hardly any jobs. Most factories were shut down because the regime told business owners: ‘You either take me as a partner without paying anything or close your business.’

“In the northwest, it’s a free economy. And next to our warehouse, we have an industrial city. It’s huge. You just drive for miles and miles full of businesses, and that’s what we’re lacking in areas previously held by the regime.”

Even if destroyed areas are rehabilitated and public services improved, reconciling local communities will be challenging after many families lost loved ones or endured persecution during the civil war.

Al-Dairi said families may struggle to forgive once they discover that those responsible for their detention or the killing of their loved ones are living among them. However, his field visit left him hopeful that people were eager to move on and would seek justice through proper channels.

“Those I spoke to, I asked: ‘Are you going to take revenge?’ They said: ‘No, not revenge, but we’ll report them and make sure justice takes its course,’” he said.

“So, hopefully, we’re talking about transitional justice, but it remains a challenge due to high corruption rates among judges. That’s something the transitional government is working on.”

He added: “There is a sense that we need to forgive so we can move on, but at the same time, we should not forgive people who committed crimes.




Despite harsh conditions and even abuses in host countries, many were hesitant to return, fearing arrest, persecution. (AFP)

“Reconciliation will take time, but it’s happening quicker than expected. Families are fed up. They just want to move on. They just want to return to their homes, if they can, to plant their land and find jobs.”

Syrian journalist Haj Youssef says it remains unclear where Syria is headed and that hope hinges on the performance of the interim government.

“In the short term, it may take a year or two for the picture to become clearer — whether sanctions will be lifted and reconstruction projects will begin,” she said.

“However, this largely depends on the performance of the current transitional authority and the direction in which the state is heading.”

 


Analysis: Can Iran’s proxies save the regime?

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Analysis: Can Iran’s proxies save the regime?

  • Hezbollah escalates on Israel’s border as Iraqi militias and Houthis calculate costs of deeper confrontation
  • Militias balance retaliation and restraint, deploying to signal strength without triggering all-out regional war

LONDON: Missiles and drones are again crossing Middle Eastern skies, while tanker traffic stalls at the Strait of Hormuz, raising fears that the killing of Iran’s supreme leader could spiral into a regional war with far-reaching consequences.

Oil has jumped beyond $80 a barrel, with warnings it could go much higher if key shipping lanes remain disrupted. The economic shock waves caused by any prolonged disruption could reverberate across the globe.

So far, Tehran’s retaliation against US-Israeli strikes has generated more alarm than advantage.

Arab capitals have condemned the attacks and markets have wobbled, but Iran has not succeeded in forcing governments into a stark choice between backing Israel or appearing weak by calling for restraint.

Instead, leaders have tried to hold the line, denouncing violations of sovereignty while keeping diplomatic channels open, even as the risk of miscalculation grows.

At the heart of this precarious moment sits Iran’s “axis of resistance” — Hezbollah in Lebanon, an array of Iraqi militias, and Yemen’s Houthi movement — whose responses to the crisis have appeared patchy.

For some observers, this reaction is by design.

“That didn’t happen unevenly, and I believe it is very well-rehearsed and directed from Tehran that has been for long expecting such a scenario,” British-Lebanese journalist Mohamed Chebaro told Arab News.

“Accordingly, I think each is playing their role to complement the jigsaw puzzle of how to use what’s called the strategic advantage that Iran has nurtured and prepared over the years.”

Chebaro said the militias fit into a broader strategic game in which Tehran “has not shown all its hand” and may choose to escalate later, depending on how the confrontation evolves.

In the early hours of March 2, Hezbollah fired missiles and drones at military sites in northern Israel — its biggest cross-border barrage since the 2024 ceasefire.

Israel hit back within hours, striking targets across south Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs, including command centers, weapons stores, and Hezbollah-linked media, while ordering troops to seize “strategic areas” along the border.

The Lebanese government, which had hoped Hezbollah would show restraint, took the extraordinary step of banning the group’s military activities.

Beirut appeared to go even further, with reports of the army arresting 12 Hezbollah members after rocket fire on Israel. The decision reflects public anger at being dragged into another war, as the nation’s economic crisis deepens and tens of thousands are displaced in the south.

Analysts said Hezbollah is calibrating its response — showing it will not sit idly by after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s killing, while avoiding the 2006-style rocket barrages that Lebanon cannot afford.

After a year of absorbing Israeli strikes and assassinations with limited replies, the escalation stands out as much for its delay as for its scale.

“I think the decision by Hezbollah to launch attacks on Israel really plays into Israel’s hands here,” Robert Geist Pinfold, lecturer in international security at King’s College London, told Arab News.

Pinfold said Israel had been seeking an opening for a renewed campaign, frustrated by the pace of Hezbollah’s disarmament by the US-backed Lebanese army.

“They were simply waiting for opportunities to take the matter into their own hands … giving them the excuse they needed for a new and fresh campaign, particularly south of the Litani River,” he said.

Hezbollah has framed its strikes as revenge for Khamenei’s killing and part of a wider “resistance” campaign — not a standalone Lebanon-Israel fight. Yet on the Iraqi and Yemeni fronts, Iran-aligned groups have so far moved more cautiously.

In Iraq, the umbrella Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) says it has launched waves of drone and rocket attacks on US positions in Iraq and elsewhere, citing Khamenei’s death as the trigger.

A constituent faction, Saraya Awliya Al-Dam, has claimed strikes on Irbil airport, Camp Victory near Baghdad airport, and other US-linked targets, though some claims remain unverified.

IRI statements between March 1 and 3 touted 20-plus operations a day using drones and missiles against US bases in Iraq and neighboring states, but reported damage appears limited and there have been no confirmed casualties.

Some launches were also linked in reports to attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura refinery. Tehran has denied direct responsibility while describing economic targets as “legitimate,” feeding suggestions that at least some drones may have originated from Iraq.

The militias describe their campaign as “resistance to occupation” and solidarity with Iran, insisting they are not acting on direct Iranian orders — a narrative that gives Tehran plausible deniability.

“Regardless of how much Iran is trying to (play down) its direct control of all these militias … attacking a refinery of strategic importance in a big oil producing country in the region is no small game done by militia,” said Chebaro, arguing Tehran cannot “hide behind a finger” to escape responsibility.

For Baghdad, each launch from Iraqi territory chips away at claims of restored sovereignty and complicates relations with Gulf neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia.

The larger dilemma — in Iraq as in Lebanon — is whether governments can contain these groups through dialogue and pressure, or whether any serious attempt to rein them in risks the very confrontation they are trying to avoid.

“Hezbollah did not ask permission, neither in Iraq nor in Lebanon, to do what it’s doing,” said Chebaro.

“And it’s now, as usual, the official governments (that) end up picking up the pieces to try to give reassurances and hope that the military response will only target those militia groups.”

Reining in the militias, he said, is “easier said than done.” Governments are effectively being “held hostage” — increasing pressure where possible, but avoiding direct confrontation “because that’s what they want.”

Perhaps the most surprising stance has come from Yemen’s Houthi movement.

After a spate of attacks on commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea in 2024-25 — purportedly in solidarity with Gaza — invited retaliatory strikes by the US and UK, the Houthis scaled back operations and agreed to a fragile truce.

Shipping on key routes is far safer today, although maritime analysts warn the situation remains volatile.

The movement’s leader, Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi, has issued fiery speeches insisting the “Israeli shipping ban” stands, with forces “finger on the trigger” ready to resume strikes. Such an escalation, atop the Iranian blockade of Hormuz, could cripple Red Sea-Suez trade routes.

Experts call this “controlled escalation,” preserving threats and capability without actions that would risk retaliation or threaten the Houthi militia’s control of Yemen’s coastline.

“I think that’s indicative of their relative autonomy,” said Pinfold. “The Houthi have always been more independent minded, whereas Hezbollah is very much a product of Iranian design and command and control and training.”

Past clashes have also taught the Houthis to limit direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

“This is the Houthi flexing their muscles, showing they won’t just say ‘how high’ when Tehran says ‘jump.’ They’ve got their own long-term interests in mind and their survival at stake here.”

Meanwhile, Western security agencies have repeatedly warned of Iranian intelligence plots against dissidents in Europe, but there is no public evidence so far of an activated network of “sleeper cells” linked specifically to the present crisis.

Officials said the risk is real, but remains in the realm of contingency planning and targeted surveillance rather than visible mobilization.

As Iran moves toward choosing a new supreme leader — with Mojtaba Khamenei, the late leader’s son, seen by many as the frontrunner — it remains unclear whether Tehran will unleash its proxies more aggressively or keep them restrained.

Analysts describe Iran’s current approach as “strategic patience” — deploying proxies to impose measured costs and demonstrate reach, while avoiding all-out war against the combined might of the US, Israel, and key Arab states.

Hezbollah’s limited-objective strikes and Iraqi militias’ harassment campaigns appear to fit that logic.

This restraint fuels the “paper tiger” perception of a regime that roars loudly and can certainly cause damage through partners and proxies, but has so far shown little appetite to cross thresholds that might trigger overwhelming retaliation or pull Arab countries into direct conflict.