WASHINGTON, 8 June 2003 — The Bush administration distorted intelligence and presented conjecture as evidence to justify a US invasion of Iraq, according to a retired intelligence official who served during the months before the war.
“What disturbs me deeply is what I think are the disingenuous statements made from the very top about what the intelligence did say,” said Greg Thielmann, who retired last September. “The area of distortion was greatest in the nuclear field.”
Thielmann was director of the strategic, proliferation and military issues office in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. His office was privy to classified intelligence gathered by the CIA and other agencies about Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear programs.
In Thielmann’s view, Iraq could have presented an immediate threat to US security in two areas: Either it was about to make a nuclear weapon, or it was forming close operational ties with Al-Qaeda terrorists.
Evidence was lacking for both, despite claims by President Bush and others, Thielmann said in an interview this week. Suspicions were presented as fact, contrary arguments ignored, he said.
The administration’s prewar portrayal of Iraq’s weapons capabilities has not been validated despite weeks of searching by military experts. Alleged stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons have not turned up, nor has significant evidence of a nuclear weapons program or links to the Al-Qaeda network.
Bush has said administration assertions on Iraq will be verified in time. The CIA and other agencies have vigorously defended their prewar performances.
CIA Director George Tenet, responding to similar criticism last week, said in a statement: “The integrity of our process was maintained throughout, and any suggestion to the contrary is simply wrong.” On Friday, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency acknowledged he had no hard evidence of Iraqi chemical weapons last fall but believed Iraq had a program in place to produce them.
Also Friday, Sen. John Warner, R-Va., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said he was not prepared to place blame for any intelligence shortcomings until all information is in.
“There are always times when a single sentence or a single report evokes a lot of concern and some doubt,” Warner told reporters after a closed hearing of his committee. “But thus far, in my own personal assessment of this situation, the intelligence community has diligently and forthrightly and with integrity produced intelligence and submitted it to this administration and to the Congress of the United States.”
Thielmann suggested mistakes may have been made at points all along the chain from when intelligence is gathered, analyzed, presented to the president and then provided to the public.
The evidence of a renewed nuclear program in Iraq was far more limited than the administration contended, he said.
“When the administration did talk about specific evidence — it was basically declassified, sensitive information — it did it in a way that was also not entirely honest,” Thielmann said. The Africa claim rested on a purported letter or letters between officials in Iraq and Niger held by European intelligence agencies. The communications are now accepted as forged.
