India’s Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee is playing a shrewd game. At one and the same time he wants to go easy on Pakistan but come down hard on the Kashmiri rebels. That is what is behind his double announcement on Wednesday of an invitation to Pakistani leader, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, and of an end to the cease-fire in Kashmir. Normally this interesting balancing act could never work. The Kashmir question is usually a matter of principle with Islamabad, not least because it is one to which the Pakistani public responds with deep emotion. They feel the same about it as Arabs feels for Palestine.
It is remarkable therefore that Gen. Musharraf has agreed to accept the invitation to Delhi. He cannot be unaware of Prime Minister Vajpayee’s double objective. Nor can he be unaware of the Indian leader’s penchant for high-profile gestures which are reckoned to pay dividends with public opinion. Gen. Musharraf will well remember that Vajpayee’s last venture for peace with Pakistan; his high-profile bus trip to Lahore. It might as well have been scripted in Bollywood. Other than hitting the headlines, it achieved nothing. It certainly did not prevent the subsequent virtual war between the two countries on the Heights of Kargil.
Vajpayee’s present double game is similarly infused with the desire to satisfy opinion: domestic opinion which wants to see the Kashmiri separatists smashed; and at the same time international opinion which fears any increase in tension between the two subcontinental nuclear powers. Vajpayee must have been delighted when Washington responded, almost immediately, applauding the invitation. But Musharraf is no fool. He is not walking blindly into a lion’s den.
It has been Delhi that has been nervous of responding; it is only in the wake of January’s Gujarat earthquake, when Pakistan was one of the first to respond with aid, that the ice has begun to crack. By going to the Indian capital, Musharraf commits himself to nothing, but at the same time opens the door to a dialogue that might, or might not, work. That is for the future to reveal.
Still there is one overriding advantage that he has over both previous Pakistani governments in the matter of Kashmir and over Vajpayee: as the head of a military government he is not quite so dependent on the shifting and often contradictory moods of public opinion. The Kashmiris’ fear is that Islamabad and Delhi will do a deal behind their backs. They are perhaps right to fear so. There is more to both countries’ hopes for dialogue than the Kashmir issue.
The Indians have their eyes set on US: they want American sanctions lifted, imposed after the nuclear tests in 1998, as well as increased trade between the two countries, and specifically they want an American anti-missile defense system. For its part, Pakistan, historically Washington’ s ally in the region, does not want to be isolated. The ball is very much in Vajpayee’s court. He says that the six-month cease-fire is over. The implication is that Indian forces will go on the offensive against the separatists, although this may simply be a neat turn of phrase for public consumption. In any event, the cease-fire was a myth from the point when Delhi announced it at the beginning of last Ramadan and at every time it was extended. Over a thousand people were killed in the troubled state over the last half year. But if he does order an offensive, it will be interesting how long Pakistan remains quiet. Not very long if India is seen to be smashing the activists.
Musharraf may not be so dependent on Pakistani public opinion, but he cannot ignore it altogether. A fresh offensive in Kashmir would destroy any hope of dialogue. It is up to Vajpayee if it is to happen.
