Poll finds that Arab street has no stance on Russia-Ukraine conflict
Experts highlight that general Arab opinion might be echoing the perspectives of their respective governments
Among the Gulf states, 22 percent of respondents sided with Ukraine
Updated 31 May 2022
Leen Fouad
LONDON: The majority of people in the Arab world have no stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, a striking finding from a region that has been directly economically impacted by the war, a new Arab News-YouGov survey has found.
Out of 7,835 respondents from the Arab world, 66 percent did not have a view on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, compared with 18 percent who sided with Ukraine, and 16 percent who sided with Russia.
“When you talk about public opinion, it’s much more about everyday life, in that sense the conflict is further away, it’s further away than issues that are much more important and much more immediate,” Tobias Brock, associate fellow and Middle East expert at the Royal United Services Institute, told Arab News.
“The conflict is, first of all, geographically farther away than the war in Syria, or the conflict in Yemen, or the conflict in Libya or what is going on in Israel and Palestine right now,” he said.
Brock, with Jack Senogles, recently wrote a paper on the implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for countries in the MENA region. In their paper, the authors explain that “most Middle Eastern states have been so slow off the mark in formulating their positions vis-a-vis Russia and its war.”
Opinion
This section contains relevant reference points, placed in (Opinion field)
Experts highlight that general Arab opinion might be echoing the perspectives of their respective governments, which also see the war as a European conflict.
The survey also reveals that the majority of respondents who sided with Russia came mainly from 4 out of 14 countries surveyed: Algeria (19 percent), Oman (19 percent), Qatar (19 percent) and Tunisia (18 percent).
Meanwhile in Jordan, respondents who did take a stand were divided equally (13 percent) between Russia and Ukraine.
Both Ukraine and Russia are among the top wheat exporters in the world (about 29 percent of global supply), and on which many countries in the Arab region depend. One would assume, for example, that Egyptians — who source 85 percent of their wheat from Russia and Ukraine combined — would be more opinionated about the conflict.
Among the Gulf states, 22 percent of respondents sided with Ukraine, compared with 15 percent with Russia. While the difference is somewhat insignificant, two Gulf states stand out for favoring Russia over Ukraine, namely Oman and Qatar, both with 19 percent of respondents favoring Russia.
Oman and Russia have enjoyed good bilateral relations, particularly in the past few years as Muscat seeks to diversify its relations with non-Western powers. Trade between both countries have also increased significantly, growing by 62 percent in 2018.
In early May, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Oman to discuss trade. The two countries have announced a wide package of bilateral agreements, including a mutual visa exemption program.
Much like other Arab states, Oman did not take a concrete stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict but affirmed its position that the two countries should reach political and diplomatic solutions through dialogue.
While state attitudes do not necessarily determine how the general public will side in a conflict, experts believe that sometimes public opinion mirrors state behavior, which might explain the slightly higher than average position of Oman on the Russia-Ukraine war.
Israel’s Somaliland gambit: what’s at risk for the region?
Somaliland’s strategic location near the Bab Al-Mandab raises fears an Israeli security presence could turn the Red Sea into a powder keg
Critics argue the decision revives Israel’s “periphery” strategy, encouraging fragmentation of Arab and Muslim states for strategic advantage
Updated 28 December 2025
Arab News
RIYADH: It perhaps comes as no surprise to seasoned regional observers that Israel has become the first and only UN member state to formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign nation.
On Dec. 26, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar signed a joint declaration of mutual recognition alongside Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi.
For a region that has existed in a state of diplomatic limbo since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, this development is, as Abdullahi described it, “a historic moment.” But beneath the surface lies a calculated and high-stakes geopolitical gamble.
While several nations, including the UK, Ethiopia, Turkiye, and the UAE, have maintained liaison offices in the capital of Hargeisa, none had been willing to cross the Rubicon of formal state recognition.
Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, assisted by Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, signs the document formally recognizing Somalia's breakaway Somaliland region on Dec. 26, 2025. (AFP)
Israel’s decision to break this decades-long international consensus is a deliberate departure from the status quo.
By taking this step, Israel has positioned itself as the primary benefactor of a state that has long sought a seat at the international table. As Dya-Eddine Said Bamakhrama, the ambassador of Djibouti to Saudi Arabia, told Arab News, such a move is deeply disruptive.
“A unilateral declaration of separation is neither a purely legal nor an isolated political act. Rather, it carries profound structural consequences, foremost among them the deepening of internal divisions and rivalries among citizens of the same nation, the erosion of the social and political fabric of the state, and the opening of the door to protracted conflicts,” he said.
Critics argue that Israel has long lobbied for the further carving up of the region under various guises.
This recognition of Somaliland is seen by many in the Arab world as a continuation of a strategy aimed at weakening centralized Arab and Muslim states by encouraging peripheral secessionist movements.
Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi. (AFP file photo)
In the Somali context, this path is perceived not as a humanitarian gesture, but as a method to undermine the national understandings reached within the framework of a federal Somalia.
According to Ambassador Bamakhrama, the international community has historically resisted such moves to prioritize regional stability over “separatist tendencies whose dangers and high costs history has repeatedly demonstrated.”
By ignoring this precedent, Israel is accused of using recognition as a tool to fragment regional cohesion.
In the past, Israel has often framed its support for non-state actors or separatist groups under the pretext of protecting vulnerable minorities — such as the Druze in the Levant or Maronites in Lebanon.
This “Periphery Doctrine” served a dual purpose: it created regional allies and supported Israel’s own claim of being a Jewish state by validating the idea of ethnic or religious self-determination.
However, in the case of Somaliland, the gloves are off completely. The argument here is not about protecting a religious minority, as Somaliland is a staunchly Muslim-majority territory. Instead, the rationale is nakedly geopolitical.
Israel appears to be seeking strategic depth in a region where it has historically been isolated. Netanyahu explicitly linked the move to “the spirit of the Abraham Accords,” signaling that the primary drivers are security, maritime control, and intelligence gathering rather than the internal demographics of the Horn of Africa.
The first major win for Israel in this maneuver is the expansion of its diplomatic orbit. It could be argued that the refusal of the federal government in Mogadishu to join the Abraham Accords was an artificial barrier.
The evidence for this claim, from the Israeli perspective, is that Somaliland — a territory with a population of nearly six million and its own functioning democratic institutions — was eager to join.
Abdullahi said Somaliland would join the Abraham Accords as a “step toward regional and global peace.” Yet, this peace comes with a clear quid pro quo — formal recognition.
Residents wave Somaliland flags as they gather in downtown Hargeisa on December 26, 2025, to celebrate Israel's announcement recognizing Somaliland's statehood. (AFP)
Israel can now argue that the “Somaliland model” proves that many other Arab and Muslim entities are willing to normalize relations if their specific political or territorial interests are met.
This challenges the unified stance of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which maintain that normalization must be tied to the resolution of the Palestinian conflict.
The second major gain for Israel is the potential for a military presence in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland’s strategic position on the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, makes it a prime location for monitoring maritime traffic.
This is a ticking time bomb given that just across the narrow sea lies Yemen, where the Houthi movement — whose slogan includes “Death to Israel” — controls significant territory.
Israel may claim that a military or intelligence presence in Somaliland will boost regional security by countering Houthi threats to shipping. However, regional neighbors fear it will likely inflame tensions.
Ambassador Bamakhrama warned that an Israeli military presence would “effectively turn the region into a powder keg.”
Ambassador Dya-Eddine Said Bamakhrama, Djibouti's envoy to Saudi Arabia. (Supplied)
“Should Israel proceed with establishing a military base in a geopolitically sensitive location... such a move would be perceived in Tel Aviv as a strategic gain directed against the Arab states bordering the Red Sea — namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, and Djibouti,” he said.
The Red Sea is a “vital international maritime corridor,” and any shift in its geopolitical balance would have “repercussions extending far beyond the region,” he added.
The recognition is also a clear violation of international law and the principle of territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter.
While proponents point to exceptions like South Sudan or Kosovo, those cases involved vastly different circumstances, including prolonged genocidal conflicts and extensive UN-led transitions.
In contrast, the African Union has been firm that Somaliland remains an integral part of Somalia.
The Chairperson of the African Union Commission rejects any recognition of Somaliland and reaffirms the African Union’s unwavering commitment to the unity and sovereignty of #Somalia.
The Chairperson of the African Union Commission, H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, has taken note,… pic.twitter.com/PKN5JIvIhP
The backlash has been swift and severe. The Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the OIC have all decried the move. Even US President Donald Trump, despite his role in the original Abraham Accords, has not endorsed Israel’s decision.
When asked whether Washington would follow suit, Trump replied with a blunt “no,” adding, “Does anyone know what Somaliland is, really?”
This lack of support from Washington highlights the isolation of Israel’s position. The OIC and the foreign ministers of 21 countries have issued a joint statement warning of “serious repercussions” and rejecting any potential link between this recognition and reported plans to displace Palestinians from Gaza to the African region.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland appears to be a calculated gamble to trade diplomatic norms for strategic advantage.
While Hargeisa celebrates a long-awaited milestone, the rest of the world sees a dangerous precedent that threatens to destabilize one of the world’s most volatile corridors.
As Ambassador Bamakhrama says, the establishment of such ties “would render (Israel) the first and only state to break with the international consensus” — a move that prioritizes “narrow strategic calculations” over the stability of the international system.