Pakistan rarely gets a second chance to turn geography into trade. The slowdown around Iran’s Chabahar port may now offer one.

The US sanctions waiver that allowed India to operate at Chabahar expired on April 26, but the bigger disruption has come from the US-Iran war, which has transformed the risks surrounding Iranian infrastructure, shipping and finance. India’s 2026-27 budget made no fresh allocation for Chabahar after New Delhi said it had fulfilled its $120 million commitment for port equipment. Yet India has not abandoned the project. The port remains operational, and New Delhi retains its strategic interest. The point is not that Chabahar has closed. It is that the certainty underpinning India’s role there has weakened just as Pakistan needs to make Gwadar commercially credible.

For India, Chabahar was always about more than a port. It offered access to Afghanistan and Central Asia without passing through Pakistan, and gave New Delhi a southern node for the International North-South Transport Corridor. The 10-year operating agreement signed in May 2024 showed India still regarded the project as strategically important. But sanctions risk is no longer an abstract compliance issue. Since the war began, shipping through the Gulf and surrounding waters has faced attacks, rerouting and higher insurance costs. That makes an Iranian port harder for international banks, insurers and logistics companies to treat as a normal commercial proposition.

That creates an opening for Gwadar, but not a victory by default.

Gwadar’s strategic promise remains much larger than its cargo base. Pakistan’s Economic Survey recorded just 42,500 tons of cargo at Gwadar in July-March 2024-25. By comparison, India reported that Chabahar handled more than 60,000 TEUs of container cargo and 1.9 million tons of bulk and general cargo in 2023-24. The figures measure different things over different periods, but the gap illustrates the central problem: Chabahar has built a substantial trading footprint, while Gwadar is still trying to.

There are encouraging signs. This year, Gwadar handled several large vessels, including a 53,277-ton steel-billet shipment in May. Another vessel carrying more than 16,000 tons of Chinese industrial equipment was diverted to Gwadar the same month amid disruption around the Strait of Hormuz. The port has three multipurpose berths, modern cargo-handling equipment and road access through the Eastbay Expressway. The question is whether these one-off operations can become regular commercial flows.

Until cargo can move predictably from quay to road and rail, the port will remain more attractive on a map than on a shipper’s spreadsheet.

Hina Ayra

The constraints are well known, and Pakistan has acknowledged them. In January 2025, the government ordered a comparative analysis of Gwadar’s trade costs against regional alternatives, itself an admission that location had not yet translated into a competitive commercial offer. Later parliamentary discussions were starker: Gwadar’s port charges were reported to be higher than those at Jebel Ali, shipping-line incentives remained limited, and security threats continued to weigh on the port.

Connectivity is another weakness. Gwadar has road access, but the logistics chain into Pakistan and onward to Central Asia remains incomplete. CPEC’s Western Route links Gwadar with Quetta and the national road network, but critical sections still need investment. Rail is an even bigger gap: Gwadar lacks the integrated freight rail network a major transshipment hub needs. Until cargo can move predictably from quay to road and rail, the port will remain more attractive on a map than on a shipper’s spreadsheet.

Shipping lines are the final test. A port becomes a hub because carriers choose it, not because governments designate it one. In 2025, Pakistan’s maritime authorities were still seeking additional shipping lines for Gwadar, and the port operator has acknowledged that weak international connections have constrained volumes. Security raises costs further, because insurers price risk into every voyage. A government can waive storage charges or offer incentives, but it cannot manufacture cargo.

The war has exposed the vulnerability of concentrated trade routes. Gulf businesses need alternatives, Central Asian economies need reliable access to the sea, and China needs diversified links to the Indian Ocean. Pakistan cannot replace Chabahar, the INSTC or Gulf ports, and should not try. Its goal should be to make Gwadar one of several credible corridors, and the easiest one to choose for specific cargo flows.

Gwadar does not win because Chabahar loses. It wins only if Pakistan treats Central Asian trade as a commercial opportunity rather than a geopolitical slogan. Geography gave Pakistan the opportunity. This time, policy has to make the cargo follow.

-Hina Ayra is a public policy and international economics professional writing on trade, economic governance, connectivity, and global geopolitics. X: @HinaAyra