Lebanese army to begin disarming Palestinians in Beirut camps in mid-June

People walk past a portrait of Palestinian Hamas movement’s slain political chief Ismail Haniyeh in a narrow alleyway at the Burj al Barajneh camp for Palestinian refugees in Beirut’s southern suburbs on May 20, 2025. (AFP)
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Updated 23 May 2025
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Lebanese army to begin disarming Palestinians in Beirut camps in mid-June

  • The Lebanese and Palestinian sides agreed on starting a plan “to remove weapons from the camps, beginning mid-June,” the source told AFP
  • By longstanding convention, the Lebanese army stays out of the Palestinian camps

BEIRUT: The joint Lebanese-Palestinian committee, which convened on Friday in the presence of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam of Lebanon, agreed to begin implementing the directives outlined in the joint statement issued by the Lebanese-Palestinian summit held on Wednesday in Beirut, in terms of restricting weapons to the hands of the Lebanese state.

A source in Salam’s office told Arab News: “June 16 will mark the beginning of the Lebanese army’s deployment to Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, namely Shatila, Mar Elias and Burj Al-Barajneh camps, to take control of the Palestinian factions’ weapons.

“This will involve Lebanese army patrols inside these camps, followed by subsequent phases targeting camps in the Bekaa, northern Lebanon and south, particularly Ain Al-Hilweh, the largest, most densely populated and factionally diverse Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon, encompassing factions affiliated or non-affiliated with the liberation organization.

The source said the “implementation date will be communicated to all Palestinian factions, including Hamas,” and that “the factions will convene to agree on the mechanism, and that pressure will be applied to any group that refuses to relinquish its weapons.”

Addressing Hamas’s earlier stance linking the surrender of its weapons to that of Hezbollah, the source said “there is no connection between the two issues. Once the disarmament process begins, neither Hamas nor any other faction will be able to obstruct or impede it.”

The source said that Arab and regional actors are actively supporting Lebanon in facilitating the disarmament process.

Salam welcomed Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s decision to “resolve the issue of Palestinian weapons in the camps,” noting the “positive impact of this decision in strengthening Lebanese-Palestinian relations and improving the humanitarian and socio-economic conditions of Palestinian refugees.”

He affirmed Lebanon’s “adherence to its national principles.”

Salam called for “the swift implementation of practical steps through a clear execution mechanism and a defined timeline.”

According to a statement, both sides agreed “to launch a process to hand over weapons based on a set timetable, accompanied by practical steps to enhance the economic and social rights of Palestinian refugees, and to intensify joint meetings and coordination to put in place the necessary arrangements to immediately begin implementing these directives.”

A statement issued after talks between Abbas and Joseph Aoun, Lebanon’s president, reaffirmed “their commitment to the principle that weapons must be exclusively in the hands of the Lebanese state, to end any manifestations that contradict the logic of the Lebanese state, and the importance of respecting Lebanon’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.”

Since the Nakba — the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians through their violent displacement and dispossession of land, and the suppression of their political rights — Lebanon has had 12 Palestinian refugee camps.

According to the Population and Housing Census in the Palestinian Camps and Gatherings in Lebanon, 72.8 percent of Palestinians in the camps face dire living conditions. The rest are Syrians, Lebanese, and other foreigners, the majority of whom are foreign workers.

Abbas, during his visit, reiterated that “the refugee camps are under the sovereignty of the Lebanese state and the Lebanese army, and the presence of weapons in the camps outside the state’s authority weakens Lebanon. Any weapon that is not under the command of the state is weakening Lebanon and endangering the Palestinian cause.”

Hisham Debsi, director of the Tatweer Center for Strategic Studies and Human Development and a Palestinian researcher, characterized the Lebanese-Palestinian joint statement as “a foundational document that functions as a political, ethical, and sovereign framework. Opposition to its declared positions would be tantamount to rejecting the Lebanese government’s oath of office and ministerial declaration.”

Debsi said: “The joint statement has blocked any potential maneuvering by Hamas to retain its weapons, since the declaration provides the Lebanese state with complete Palestinian legitimacy to remove protection from any armed Palestinian individual. Abu Mazen (Abbas) has reinforced this position repeatedly throughout his Beirut meetings.”

In his assessment, “no faction can now challenge both Lebanese and Palestinian authority given this unified stance.”

Debsi highlighted “a fundamental division within Hamas’s Lebanon branch, with one camp advocating transformation into a political party with the other supporting maintaining ties to Iranian-backed groups.”

He added: “Those opposing Hamas disarmament will face political and security consequences, particularly as camp residents seek to restructure their communities beyond armed resistance, which has become obsolete and must evolve into peaceful advocacy.”


Israel’s Somaliland gambit: what’s at risk for the region?

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Israel’s Somaliland gambit: what’s at risk for the region?

  • Somaliland’s strategic location near the Bab Al-Mandab raises fears an Israeli security presence could turn the Red Sea into a powder keg
  • Critics argue the decision revives Israel’s “periphery” strategy, encouraging fragmentation of Arab and Muslim states for strategic advantage

RIYADH: It perhaps comes as no surprise to seasoned regional observers that Israel has become the first and only UN member state to formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign nation.

On Dec. 26, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar signed a joint declaration of mutual recognition alongside Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi.

For a region that has existed in a state of diplomatic limbo since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, this development is, as Abdullahi described it, “a historic moment.” But beneath the surface lies a calculated and high-stakes geopolitical gamble.

While several nations, including the UK, Ethiopia, Turkiye, and the UAE, have maintained liaison offices in the capital of Hargeisa, none had been willing to cross the Rubicon of formal state recognition.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, assisted by Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, signs the document formally recognizing Somalia's breakaway Somaliland region on Dec. 26, 2025. (AFP)

Israel’s decision to break this decades-long international consensus is a deliberate departure from the status quo.

By taking this step, Israel has positioned itself as the primary benefactor of a state that has long sought a seat at the international table. As Dya-Eddine Said Bamakhrama, the ambassador of Djibouti to Saudi Arabia, told Arab News, such a move is deeply disruptive.

“A unilateral declaration of separation is neither a purely legal nor an isolated political act. Rather, it carries profound structural consequences, foremost among them the deepening of internal divisions and rivalries among citizens of the same nation, the erosion of the social and political fabric of the state, and the opening of the door to protracted conflicts,” he said.

Critics argue that Israel has long lobbied for the further carving up of the region under various guises.

This recognition of Somaliland is seen by many in the Arab world as a continuation of a strategy aimed at weakening centralized Arab and Muslim states by encouraging peripheral secessionist movements.

Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi. (AFP file photo)

In the Somali context, this path is perceived not as a humanitarian gesture, but as a method to undermine the national understandings reached within the framework of a federal Somalia.

According to Ambassador Bamakhrama, the international community has historically resisted such moves to prioritize regional stability over “separatist tendencies whose dangers and high costs history has repeatedly demonstrated.”

By ignoring this precedent, Israel is accused of using recognition as a tool to fragment regional cohesion.

In the past, Israel has often framed its support for non-state actors or separatist groups under the pretext of protecting vulnerable minorities — such as the Druze in the Levant or Maronites in Lebanon.

This “Periphery Doctrine” served a dual purpose: it created regional allies and supported Israel’s own claim of being a Jewish state by validating the idea of ethnic or religious self-determination.

However, in the case of Somaliland, the gloves are off completely. The argument here is not about protecting a religious minority, as Somaliland is a staunchly Muslim-majority territory. Instead, the rationale is nakedly geopolitical.

Israel appears to be seeking strategic depth in a region where it has historically been isolated. Netanyahu explicitly linked the move to “the spirit of the Abraham Accords,” signaling that the primary drivers are security, maritime control, and intelligence gathering rather than the internal demographics of the Horn of Africa.

The first major win for Israel in this maneuver is the expansion of its diplomatic orbit. It could be argued that the refusal of the federal government in Mogadishu to join the Abraham Accords was an artificial barrier.

The evidence for this claim, from the Israeli perspective, is that Somaliland — a territory with a population of nearly six million and its own functioning democratic institutions — was eager to join.

Abdullahi said Somaliland would join the Abraham Accords as a “step toward regional and global peace.” Yet, this peace comes with a clear quid pro quo — formal recognition.

Residents wave Somaliland flags as they gather in downtown Hargeisa on December 26, 2025, to celebrate Israel's announcement recognizing Somaliland's statehood. (AFP)

Israel can now argue that the “Somaliland model” proves that many other Arab and Muslim entities are willing to normalize relations if their specific political or territorial interests are met.

This challenges the unified stance of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which maintain that normalization must be tied to the resolution of the Palestinian conflict.

The second major gain for Israel is the potential for a military presence in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland’s strategic position on the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, makes it a prime location for monitoring maritime traffic.

This is a ticking time bomb given that just across the narrow sea lies Yemen, where the Houthi movement — whose slogan includes “Death to Israel” — controls significant territory.

Israel may claim that a military or intelligence presence in Somaliland will boost regional security by countering Houthi threats to shipping. However, regional neighbors fear it will likely inflame tensions.

Ambassador Bamakhrama warned that an Israeli military presence would “effectively turn the region into a powder keg.”

Ambassador Dya-Eddine Said Bamakhrama, Djibouti's envoy to Saudi Arabia. (Supplied)

“Should Israel proceed with establishing a military base in a geopolitically sensitive location... such a move would be perceived in Tel Aviv as a strategic gain directed against the Arab states bordering the Red Sea — namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, and Djibouti,” he said.

The Red Sea is a “vital international maritime corridor,” and any shift in its geopolitical balance would have “repercussions extending far beyond the region,” he added.

The recognition is also a clear violation of international law and the principle of territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter.

While proponents point to exceptions like South Sudan or Kosovo, those cases involved vastly different circumstances, including prolonged genocidal conflicts and extensive UN-led transitions.

In contrast, the African Union has been firm that Somaliland remains an integral part of Somalia.

The backlash has been swift and severe. The Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the OIC have all decried the move. Even US President Donald Trump, despite his role in the original Abraham Accords, has not endorsed Israel’s decision.

When asked whether Washington would follow suit, Trump replied with a blunt “no,” adding, “Does anyone know what Somaliland is, really?”

This lack of support from Washington highlights the isolation of Israel’s position. The OIC and the foreign ministers of 21 countries have issued a joint statement warning of “serious repercussions” and rejecting any potential link between this recognition and reported plans to displace Palestinians from Gaza to the African region.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland appears to be a calculated gamble to trade diplomatic norms for strategic advantage.

While Hargeisa celebrates a long-awaited milestone, the rest of the world sees a dangerous precedent that threatens to destabilize one of the world’s most volatile corridors.

As Ambassador Bamakhrama says, the establishment of such ties “would render (Israel) the first and only state to break with the international consensus” — a move that prioritizes “narrow strategic calculations” over the stability of the international system.