BEIRUT: With the fall of the Daesh group’s last significant stronghold in Syria, Iranian and Russian-backed Syrian troops now turn to face off with their main rival, the US-backed forces holding large oil fields and strategic territory in the country’s north and east.
The complicated map puts US and Iranian forces at close proximity, just across the Euphrates River from each other, amid multiple hotspots that could turn violent, particularly in the absence of a clear American policy.
There are already signs.
Iran threatened last week that Syrian troops will advance toward Raqqa, the former Daesh capital, which fell to the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces in October, raising the potential for a clash there. The Kurdish-led SDF also controls some of Syria’s largest oil fields, in the oil-rich eastern Deir Ezzor province, an essential resource that the Syrian government also says it will take back.
The question now is whether the United States is willing to confront the troops of Syrian President Bashar Assad and Iranian-backed militiamen. The Kurds are seeking a clear American commitment to help them defend their gains. American officials have said little of their plans and objectives in Syria beyond general statements about continuing to deny Daesh safe havens and continuing to train and equip allies.
Washington seems to be hoping to negotiate a deal for Syria that would protect the Kurds’ ambitions for autonomy while limiting Iran’s ambitions for a presence in Syria. Four US officials said Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin could announce a Russian-US deal on how they hope to Syria’s war after Daesh’s defeat if they meet Friday at a conference in Vietnam. However, prospect of such a meeting uncertain, it was not clear if such a deal had been reached.
But Assad underlined that his government plans to regain all of Syria and will now fight against plans to “partition” Syria, a reference to Kurdish aspirations for a recognized autonomous zone in the north.
Government victories “have foiled all partition plans and the goals of terrorism and the countries sponsoring it,” Assad said during a meeting this week with Ali Akbar Velayati, the adviser of Iran’s supreme leader.
With its collapse in Boukamal on Thursday, the Daesh group has no major territory left in Syria or Iraq. Its militants are believed to have pulled back into the desert, east and west of the Euphrates River. The group has a small presence near the capital, Damascus. Late Thursday, the extremist group carried out a counteroffensive in Boukamal, regaining control of more than 40 percent of the border town.
The Euphrates now stands as the dividing line between Syrian government troops and the SDF in much of Deir Ezzor province.
Government forces and their allies, including Iranian troops and fighters from the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, control the western bank. They hold the provincial capital and several small oil fields.
The Kurdish-led force, along with American troops advising them, is on the eastern bank. They hold two of Syria’s largest oil fields, nearly a dozen smaller ones, one of the largest gas fields and large parts of the border with Iraq. They say they are determined to keep the government from crossing the river.
The coalition had said for weeks that the SDF was pushing toward Boukamal. With Assad’s forces taking the town, the coalition said in a statement to the AP on Friday that the SDF is now moving on Baghuz, a village also on the border near Boukamal but on the eastern bank of the Euphrates.
Iran’s Velayati said the US presence aims to divide Syria. “They have not and will not succeed in Iraq and they will also not succeed in Syria,” he said during a visit to Lebanon last weekend. “We will soon see the Syrian government and popular forces in Syria east of the Euphrates and they will liberate the city of Raqqa.”
The US coalition declined to comment on Velayati’s remarks, saying “it would not be appropriate to comment on speculation or rumor by any third party.”
Washington has been wary of Iran’s increasing influence in the area and its attempts to establish a land corridor from Iran across Iraq and Syria to Lebanon.
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis acknowledged this week that allies have pressed for a clearer US policy in Syria. The priority was to get the UN-sponsored peace talks back on track, he said, offering few details.
“We’re trying to get this into the diplomatic mode so we can get things sorted out ... and make certain (that) minorities — whoever they are — are not just subject to more of what we’ve seen” under Assad, he said, apparently referring to ensuring some sort of accommodation to Kurdish ambitions.
The talks, scheduled for Nov. 28, have already been challenged by Russia, which seeks a bigger role. Moscow called for intra-Syrian talks to chart a political process and invited the dominant Kurdish party that forms the backbone of the SDF, the first such international invitation. A date for the Russia talks has not been set.
Yezid Sayigh, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, predicted the Syrian government will use military pressure to reach a negotiated solution with the Kurds amid lack of evidence that the US has any “commitment to engineering political change in Syria or indeed has a Syria policy at all.” In an article last week in the Al-Hayat newspaper, Sayigh said Russia is the likely arbiter between Kurds and the government.
Ilham Ahmed, a senior politician with the political arm of the SDF, said indirect talks with the government have taken place but there are no signs of a change in their position.
“A clear position from the coalition can prevent confrontation,” she said.
Meanwhile, the Kurdish-led SDF faces the complications of trying to run Arab-dominated areas. With US-backing, the force sought to allay any Arab residents’ fears of Kurdish domination by forming joint local councils and electing Arab and Kurdish officials.
But this week, the SDF-held town of Manbij saw protests by Arab residents against compulsory military conscription imposed by the SDF. Hundreds were briefly detained, according to Mohammed Khaled, with activist-operated Aleppo 24.
Ahmed described the protests as “fabricated” by the government and Turkey, which sees Kurdish aspirations as a threat.
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Associated Press writers Josh Lederman and Matthew Lee in Washington contributed to this report.
After Daesh collapse, Syria government faces US-backed Kurds
After Daesh collapse, Syria government faces US-backed Kurds
Israel’s Somaliland gambit: what’s at risk for the region?
- Somaliland’s strategic location near the Bab Al-Mandab raises fears an Israeli security presence could turn the Red Sea into a powder keg
- Critics argue the decision revives Israel’s “periphery” strategy, encouraging fragmentation of Arab and Muslim states for strategic advantage
RIYADH: It perhaps comes as no surprise to seasoned regional observers that Israel has become the first and only UN member state to formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign nation.
On Dec. 26, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar signed a joint declaration of mutual recognition alongside Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi.
For a region that has existed in a state of diplomatic limbo since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, this development is, as Abdullahi described it, “a historic moment.” But beneath the surface lies a calculated and high-stakes geopolitical gamble.
While several nations, including the UK, Ethiopia, Turkiye, and the UAE, have maintained liaison offices in the capital of Hargeisa, none had been willing to cross the Rubicon of formal state recognition.
Israel’s decision to break this decades-long international consensus is a deliberate departure from the status quo.
By taking this step, Israel has positioned itself as the primary benefactor of a state that has long sought a seat at the international table. As Dya-Eddine Said Bamakhrama, the ambassador of Djibouti to Saudi Arabia, told Arab News, such a move is deeply disruptive.
“A unilateral declaration of separation is neither a purely legal nor an isolated political act. Rather, it carries profound structural consequences, foremost among them the deepening of internal divisions and rivalries among citizens of the same nation, the erosion of the social and political fabric of the state, and the opening of the door to protracted conflicts,” he said.
Critics argue that Israel has long lobbied for the further carving up of the region under various guises.
This recognition of Somaliland is seen by many in the Arab world as a continuation of a strategy aimed at weakening centralized Arab and Muslim states by encouraging peripheral secessionist movements.
In the Somali context, this path is perceived not as a humanitarian gesture, but as a method to undermine the national understandings reached within the framework of a federal Somalia.
According to Ambassador Bamakhrama, the international community has historically resisted such moves to prioritize regional stability over “separatist tendencies whose dangers and high costs history has repeatedly demonstrated.”
By ignoring this precedent, Israel is accused of using recognition as a tool to fragment regional cohesion.
In the past, Israel has often framed its support for non-state actors or separatist groups under the pretext of protecting vulnerable minorities — such as the Druze in the Levant or Maronites in Lebanon.
This “Periphery Doctrine” served a dual purpose: it created regional allies and supported Israel’s own claim of being a Jewish state by validating the idea of ethnic or religious self-determination.
However, in the case of Somaliland, the gloves are off completely. The argument here is not about protecting a religious minority, as Somaliland is a staunchly Muslim-majority territory. Instead, the rationale is nakedly geopolitical.
Israel appears to be seeking strategic depth in a region where it has historically been isolated. Netanyahu explicitly linked the move to “the spirit of the Abraham Accords,” signaling that the primary drivers are security, maritime control, and intelligence gathering rather than the internal demographics of the Horn of Africa.
The first major win for Israel in this maneuver is the expansion of its diplomatic orbit. It could be argued that the refusal of the federal government in Mogadishu to join the Abraham Accords was an artificial barrier.
The evidence for this claim, from the Israeli perspective, is that Somaliland — a territory with a population of nearly six million and its own functioning democratic institutions — was eager to join.
Abdullahi said Somaliland would join the Abraham Accords as a “step toward regional and global peace.” Yet, this peace comes with a clear quid pro quo — formal recognition.
Israel can now argue that the “Somaliland model” proves that many other Arab and Muslim entities are willing to normalize relations if their specific political or territorial interests are met.
This challenges the unified stance of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which maintain that normalization must be tied to the resolution of the Palestinian conflict.
The second major gain for Israel is the potential for a military presence in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland’s strategic position on the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, makes it a prime location for monitoring maritime traffic.
This is a ticking time bomb given that just across the narrow sea lies Yemen, where the Houthi movement — whose slogan includes “Death to Israel” — controls significant territory.
Israel may claim that a military or intelligence presence in Somaliland will boost regional security by countering Houthi threats to shipping. However, regional neighbors fear it will likely inflame tensions.
Ambassador Bamakhrama warned that an Israeli military presence would “effectively turn the region into a powder keg.”
“Should Israel proceed with establishing a military base in a geopolitically sensitive location... such a move would be perceived in Tel Aviv as a strategic gain directed against the Arab states bordering the Red Sea — namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, and Djibouti,” he said.
The Red Sea is a “vital international maritime corridor,” and any shift in its geopolitical balance would have “repercussions extending far beyond the region,” he added.
The recognition is also a clear violation of international law and the principle of territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter.
While proponents point to exceptions like South Sudan or Kosovo, those cases involved vastly different circumstances, including prolonged genocidal conflicts and extensive UN-led transitions.
In contrast, the African Union has been firm that Somaliland remains an integral part of Somalia.
The backlash has been swift and severe. The Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the OIC have all decried the move. Even US President Donald Trump, despite his role in the original Abraham Accords, has not endorsed Israel’s decision.
When asked whether Washington would follow suit, Trump replied with a blunt “no,” adding, “Does anyone know what Somaliland is, really?”
This lack of support from Washington highlights the isolation of Israel’s position. The OIC and the foreign ministers of 21 countries have issued a joint statement warning of “serious repercussions” and rejecting any potential link between this recognition and reported plans to displace Palestinians from Gaza to the African region.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland appears to be a calculated gamble to trade diplomatic norms for strategic advantage.
While Hargeisa celebrates a long-awaited milestone, the rest of the world sees a dangerous precedent that threatens to destabilize one of the world’s most volatile corridors.
As Ambassador Bamakhrama says, the establishment of such ties “would render (Israel) the first and only state to break with the international consensus” — a move that prioritizes “narrow strategic calculations” over the stability of the international system.
