JERUSALEM/BEIRUT: Two Israeli air strikes against Hezbollah targets in Syria in recent weeks seem to mark a more openly assertive stance toward the group after years of shadow boxing, requiring careful calibration to avoid escalation into a war that neither wants.
For most of the six-year-long conflict in Syria, Israel has stuck determinedly to the sidelines, not wanting to get sucked into the chaos unfolding to its northeast. While it is suspected of carrying out occasional attacks against minor targets, it has tended not to confirm or deny involvement.
But it is determined to stop Lebanon’s Hezbollah, with which it fought a 2006 war, and which it sees as the top strategic threat on its borders, from using its role in the Syrian war to gain weapons and experience that could ultimately endanger Israel.
Since early in the conflict, the Shiite movement’s energies have been focused on propping up President Bashar Assad in alliance with Iran and Russia, throwing thousands of its fighters into battle against Syrian rebels.
But although this strategy makes the prospect of a new war with Israel unwelcome to Hezbollah, it has not altered its view of the country as its foremost enemy, or stopped it strengthening its position for any new conflict.
In the past six weeks, two Israeli attacks appear to have marked a shift, underscoring Israel’s intent to squeeze Hezbollah and coming as the Trump administration carried out its own missile strikes in Syria.
In both cases, Israeli officials have also been less guarded about acknowledging who was behind the attacks.
On March 17, Israel struck a site near Palmyra, prompting Syria’s army to retaliate with Russian-supplied anti-aircraft missiles and on April 27, it hit an arms depot in Damascus where Hezbollah was suspected of storing weapons supplied by Iran.
“The incident in Syria corresponds completely with Israel’s policy to act to prevent Iran’s smuggling of advanced weapons via Syria to Hezbollah,” Intelligence Minister Israel Katz said of the strike last week, but without explicitly confirming Israel carried it out.
Hezbollah has also bared its teeth, conducting a media tour along the Lebanon-Israel border that was widely interpreted as a message that it was unafraid of a new war, and hinting that any coming conflict might involve attacks on Israeli settlements.
A larger strike by Israel, or one that misses its target with unintended consequences, might provoke an escalation, further destabilising Syria and sucking Israel into an already complex conflict.
It’s an outcome that neither Israel nor Hezbollah wants, but in a war that has already produced many unpredictable outcomes, it is not out of the question either.
Rules of the game
Hezbollah is an Iranian-backed movement that was formed to combat Israel’s 1982-2000 occupation of Lebanon. Its battlefield prowess, extensive social works among Lebanese Shiites and its alliance with powerful regional states have helped it secure a dominant role in the country’s politics.
Since the 2006 war with Israel, which killed more than 1,300 people, displaced a million in Lebanon and up to 500,000 in Israel, both sides have engaged in brinkmanship but avoided renewed conflict.
Both say they do not want another war, but don’t shy away from saying they are ready for one if it does end up happening.
Last month, Hezbollah took Lebanese journalists on a tour of the southern frontier with Israel, allowing pictures to be taken of soldiers posing with weapons and staring across the border.
Israel runs patrols along the same frontier, sends up drones and is constantly bolstering its defenses. In March, Israeli minister Naftali Bennett, a hard-liner, threatened to send Lebanon back to the Middle Ages if Hezbollah provoked another war.
An official in the military alliance that backs Assad said Israel’s recent air strikes had hit Hezbollah targets but played down the damage done. As for retaliation, they drew a distinction between Israel striking Hezbollah units deployed to fight on behalf of Assad in Syria and those at home in Lebanon.
“If Israel hits a Hezbollah convoy in Syria, Hezbollah will decide if it will respond or not according to the circumstances in Syria because, despite everything, Syria is a sovereign state and Hezbollah cannot respond in a way that embarrasses the regime,” the official told Reuters on condition of anonymity.
“If Israel strikes Hezbollah in Lebanon, definitely it will respond. If Hezbollah responds, what is the size of its response that Israel can accept? This could mean an escalation to war. So Israel avoids hitting Hezbollah convoys or rockets inside Lebanon and prefers to strike it inside Syria.”
That analysis fits with how Israel broadly sees the situation, too. Keeping any fallout from the war in Syria away from its territorial interests is one thing. But going after Hezbollah in Lebanon would be the trigger for renewed conflict.
“A clash with Hezbollah is always an active possibility,” said one Israeli diplomat.
While the enmity is fierce on either side, past experience seems to have made both Hezbollah and Israel sharp analysts of one another’s positions and pressure points.
“Sometimes there is a measured response which maintains the balance of deterrence and the rules of the game and sometimes there is a response which opens the door to escalation,” said the official from the alliance backing Assad.
“Right now, the desire of both sides is to not get dragged into a war or to open a new front, either in Golan or the south. But at any moment events can develop and things can escalate into war without either side wanting it.”
Russia-Israel axis
Russia — an ally of Hezbollah in the Syrian conflict but which has also coordinated closely with Israel — has also taken note of Israel’s actions.
For the past two years, Israel and Russia have coordinated closely on Syria, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meeting face-to-face with Russian President Vladimir Putin and often speaking by phone to ensure there are no misunderstandings and that the risk of aerial confrontations is minimized.
For the most part, the system has worked, even if it requires Israel to be delicate in balancing ties with the United States and Russia at the same time. But the most recent incidents appear to have angered Moscow.
After the March strike, Russia summoned Israel’s ambassador for consultations, and after the Damascus airport attack the foreign ministry issued a statement calling it unacceptable and urging Israel to exercise restraint.
“We consider that all countries should avoid any actions that lead to higher tensions in such a troubled region and call for Syrian sovereignty to be respected,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters.
A new war between Israel and Hezbollah could distract the Shiite movement from its central role in the Syrian conflict, thereby undermining a military campaign in which Russia has staked great resources and prestige.
Israeli analysts think Netanyahu’s government must exercise caution. “Israel still has to walk on eggshells and attack only if the destruction of the target is vital and pertains directly to Israeli security,” military specialist Alex Fishman wrote in Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper last week.
Israeli ministers, several of whom have a Russian background, also appear determined to avoid provoking Moscow. “We’ll do nothing fast and loose when it comes to the Russians,” said the Israeli diplomat. “We’ll be super-careful in Syria.”
Israeli strikes raise stakes in face-off with Hezbollah
Israeli strikes raise stakes in face-off with Hezbollah
How Gaza’s shattered fishing industry deepened the enclave’s food security crisis
- Once a pillar of local food security, Gaza’s fishing sector has been reduced to a fraction of its prewar capacity
- UN agencies warn the destruction of boats and ports has deepened aid dependence and worsened protein shortages
DUBAI: Gaza’s fishing industry — once a critical source of food, income and affordable protein — has been largely destroyed as a result of Israel’s war with Hamas, worsening the Palestinian enclave’s food security crisis.
According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, fishing activity in Gaza now stands at less than 10 percent of prewar levels following the widespread destruction of boats, ports and equipment, combined with prolonged maritime closures enforced under Israel’s naval blockade.
UN and human rights organizations estimate that up to 72 percent of Gaza’s fishing fleet has been damaged or destroyed, alongside near-total devastation of related infrastructure, including landing sites, storage facilities and repair workshops.
The remaining vessels are small, damaged skiffs capable of operating only meters from shore.
Ramzy Baroud, a journalist, author and editor of The Palestine Chronicle, said the destruction of Gaza’s fishing sector must be understood as part of a deliberate policy aimed at preventing Palestinians from developing independent food-producing systems.
Baroud says Israel had pursued a strategy since 1967 to foster Palestinian dependency — first on the Israeli economy, and later on humanitarian aid entering Gaza through Israeli-controlled crossings — leaving the population permanently vulnerable to economic collapse.
“This vulnerability is functional for Israel, as it allows the Israeli government and military to leverage their control over Palestinian lives through political pressure in pursuit of concessions,” he told Arab News.
Palestinians were prevented from developing local industry through restrictions on imports and exports, while much of Gaza’s arable land was seized or turned into military targets, he said.
“Likewise, the fishing sector was deliberately crippled through direct attacks on fishermen, including arrests, live fire, confiscation of equipment, and the sinking or destruction of boats,” he added.
FAO has documented widespread destruction across Gaza’s coastal fishing areas.
“In Gaza’s fishing areas now lie broken boats, torn nets, and ruined infrastructure, standing in stark contrast to the once-vibrant industry that supported thousands of fishers for generations,” Beth Bechdol, FAO deputy director-general, said in a statement.
Before the war, more than 4,000 registered fishermen worked along Gaza’s 40-kilometer coastline, supporting tens of thousands of family members and contributing to local food security in an enclave heavily dependent on imports.
Today, the majority have been stripped of their livelihoods, as access to the sea has become sporadic, dangerous, or entirely prohibited.
For decades, fishing off Gaza was restricted to shifting maritime zones — typically between three and 12 nautical miles offshore — often tightened or closed entirely during periods of escalation.
Since October 2023, when the Israel-Hamas conflict began, humanitarian organizations say there have been extended periods of total maritime closure, effectively banning fishing and depriving Gaza’s population of one of its few remaining sources of local food production.
Baroud said the assault on Gaza’s fishing sector was not a by-product of war, but part of a deliberate strategy that intensified during the conflict.
“For Gaza, the sea represents freedom,” he said. “All of Gaza’s other borders are controlled by Israel, either directly or indirectly.”
Israel had consistently worked to deny Palestinians access to the sea, he said. And despite commitments under the Oslo Accords to allow fishing up to 20 nautical miles offshore, those provisions were never honored.
“The assault on Gaza’s fishing sector is therefore not incidental,” Baroud said. “It is about severing Palestinians from one of the few spaces not entirely enclosed by walls, checkpoints, and military control.”
Israel has generally rejected or not accepted accusations that it is unlawfully targeting Gaza’s fishermen, framing incidents at sea as enforcement of security zones or as under investigation rather than deliberate attacks on civilians.
In past lethal incidents at sea highlighted by Human Rights Watch, the Israel Defense Forces have typically said boats “deviated from the designated fishing zone” and that forces fired after warnings were ignored.
According to FAO, rebuilding Gaza’s fishing sector will be impossible without a fundamental change in access and security conditions.
“For Gazans, the sea was not just a source of food, but a source of livelihood and identity,” Bechdol said.
“FAO can assist to help rebuild Gaza’s fishing industry. But for this to happen, peace must first be established and fishers must be allowed to operate their boats and cast their nets without fear of harm.”
Ciro Fiorillo, head of the FAO office for the West Bank and Gaza, said the agency is primed to offer assistance once the security situation improves.
“FAO is ready to restart projects, replenish damaged boats and equipment, and inject emergency funds as soon as these key fishing inputs for production are allowed to enter the Strip, a sustained ceasefire is in place, and access to the sea is restored,” Fiorillo said in a statement.
Since the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on southern Israel triggered the Israeli military assault on Gaza, much of the enclave has been flattened, tens of thousands killed, and some 90 percent of the population displaced.
Even since the ceasefire came into effect with the exchange of hostages and prisoners in October last year, pockets of violence have continued and humanitarian needs remain dire. The collapse of fishing has only compounded an already catastrophic food crisis.
The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has repeatedly warned that the destruction of food-producing systems — including agriculture, fisheries and markets — has pushed Gaza toward famine, with households facing extreme shortages of protein and calories.
With farmland destroyed, livestock killed and imports severely restricted, fish was once among the few foods that could still be sourced locally.
Its near disappearance has driven prices beyond reach for most families and increased dependence on limited humanitarian aid.
“This is about denying Palestinians access to life itself — to survival,” said Baroud.
The destruction of fishing forces Palestinians into deeper dependence on humanitarian aid that Israel itself controls, effectively weaponizing food rather than allowing Palestinians to sustain themselves independently, he said.
Human rights groups documenting maritime enforcement report that fishermen attempting to operate — even close to the shore — face gunfire, pursuit, detention and arrest, contributing to a climate in which fishing has become a life-threatening activity rather than a livelihood.
According to rights monitors, the destruction of larger vessels has eliminated the possibility of reaching deeper waters, forcing the few remaining fishermen to operate in unsafe, shallow zones with damaged equipment, limited fuel and no protection.
Baroud said international law clearly obligates an occupying power to protect civilian livelihoods and ensure access to food and means of survival.
“The systematic targeting of fishermen — who are civilians engaged in subsistence activity — cannot be justified as a military necessity, especially when it results in starvation and famine,” Baroud said.
He said the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits collective punishment, the destruction of civilian infrastructure and the targeting of livelihoods.
The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights has described the restriction of Gaza’s fishing sector as part of a broader assault on civilian survival systems, warning that the denial of access to the sea has direct implications for nutrition, employment and aid dependency.
Baroud said the recovery of Gaza’s fishing sector could not occur in isolation from the broader economy.
“Only a measure of real freedom for Palestinians — freedom of movement, access to land and sea, and the ability to import, export and produce independently — can allow Gaza’s industries and economy to recover,” he said.
Without ending the system of control governing Palestinian life, Baroud said, any discussion of reconstruction or recovery would remain hollow.
As famine warnings intensify, the fishing sector’s collapse stands as a stark example of how Gaza’s food system has fractured.
What was once a daily livelihood is now reduced to occasional, high-risk attempts to secure food.
With no functioning fleet and no safe access to waters, Gaza’s fishermen are operating at the edge of survival.
