The timing of Pakistan’s Zainebiyoun Brigade ban is significant
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On March 29, Pakistan’s Interior Ministry issued a notification it was banning the Iran-backed Pakistani Shia militant group, the Zainebiyoun Brigade. The notification became public on April 11 and signifies continuing Iran-Pakistan tensions since the two engaged in tit-for-tat strikes against alleged militant hideouts in each other’s territories. Though both sides officially announced de-escalation and the restoration of normal ties, tensions have simmered at the sub-state levels. Pakistan’s decision to ban the Zainebiyoun Brigade will further strain the already tense relationship amid a rapidly evolving situation in the Middle East. Before this, Pakistan has banned two obscure Iran-supported Shia militant outfits, Ansar-ul-Hussain and its offshoot, Khatam-ul-Anbia, under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) 1997 in 2016 and 2020, respectively, for recruiting Pakistani Shias to fight in Syria.
The Zainebiyoun Brigade emerged during the Syrian civil war to protect Shia holy sites in the country. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) recruited, trained and financed Pakistani militants to fight in Syria. In return, they were reportedly paid a monthly salary of $500-700, and the families of slain militants were given Iranian residency. Reportedly, the Zainebiyoun Brigade has around 1,000-1,500 militants in its ranks primarily drawn from Karachi, Parachinar, Gilgit-Baltistan and Quetta. Following Daesh’s defeat in Syria and with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Zainebiyoun militants started trickling back to their native areas in Pakistan. However, the Zainebiyoun militants maintained a low profile and did not engage in any major militant activity in Pakistan. Still, fears remained that Iran could use the Zainebiyoun Brigade as a proxy against Pakistan to stoke sectarian tensions.
The Zainebiyoun Brigade became active in Pakistan during the 2019-2021 period as its militants engaged in targeted killings of religious scholars. Among these, the most noted assassination attempt was on eminent scholar Mufti Taqi Usmani in Karachi in March 2019, which he narrowly escaped. Usmani survived another botched attempt in July 2021 as well. In January 2024, Sindh’s Counter Terrorism Department arrested the main perpetrator of the attack, Syed Muhammad Mehdi, a militant associated with the Zainebiyoun Brigade from Karachi. Likewise, several Zainebiyoun militants were apprehended across Pakistan involved in sectarian militancy.
The Middle East’s evolving situation will be a key determinant of the future trajectory of Iran-Pakistan relations.
- Abdul Basit Khan
The Zainebiyoun Brigade’s growing activities forced Pakistani officials to change their stance that since the outfit’s mandate was Syrian-centric, it did not pose any significant security threat to Pakistan. Yet, while maintaining a strict vigilance of the Zainebiyoun Brigade’s activities and apprehending its associates, no decision was taken to ban the group. It bears mention that the United States designated the Zainebiyoun Brigade, and its Afghan counterpart the Fatimiyoun Brigade, as terrorist organizations in January 2019.
Pakistan decided in principle to add the Zainebiyoun Brigade to the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)’s list of proscribed organizations in January following Iran-Pakistan tensions. However, the decision was implemented on March 29 and publicized on April 11. It has emerged ahead of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s expected visit to Pakistan in April’s third week. The timing of the announcement is critical and requires some elaboration.
First, following the Iran-Pakistan tensions in January, the latter feared continued sub-state level tensions through proxy groups, bringing into sharp focus the Zainebiyoun Brigade’s subversive role. Fearing retaliation from Tehran for tolerating the anti-Iran militant group Jaish Al-Adl’s presence in Balochistan, Islamabad decided to ban the Zainebiyoun Brigade. However, since the caretaker government was ruling the country, the official announcement was held back.
Second, after Israel’s attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria, tensions are rising in the Middle East in the anticipation of Tehran’s retaliation and its aftermath. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has warned that “Israel must be punished, and it shall be” for attacking the Iranian consulate, raising the spectres of a region-wide conflict. Keeping in view the Middle East’s volatile situation, Pakistan fears that Iran could mobilize its proxies, like the Zainebiyoun Brigade, to wage a protracted proxy war against Israel and its interests across the Middle East and has publicly announced the decision of banning the group.
Third, Iran, apart from backing the Zainebiyoun Brigade, has also provided sanctuaries to Baloch separatist groups. Hence, Pakistan has moved swiftly and publicized the decision to ban the Zainebiyoun Brigade to secure its long-term strategic and economic interests.
Finally, the ban on the Zainebiyoun Brigade ahead of the Iranian President’s trip is aimed at building pressure on Iran to stop its sectarian proxy war in Pakistan. After Iran, Pakistan is home to the second largest Shia population in the world, which is 15-20 percent of the country’s predominantly Sunni population. The Zainebiyoun Brigade’s militants are battle-hardened and gained active combat exposure while fighting on the side of Bashar Assad regime in Syria. The Zainebiyoun Brigade’s militant activities can throw Pakistan’s into a new round of ethnically motivated tensions.
Presently, Iran is fixated on its next move against Israel after the bombing of its Syrian consulate. At any rate, the Middle East’s evolving situation will be a key determinant of the future trajectory of Iran-Pakistan relations.
The author is a Senior Associate Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. X: @basitresearcher.
