Afghanistan-Pakistan relations: Back to the future?

Following the devastating earthquake in Afghanistan’s Herat province, the Taliban interim regime blocked relief assistance from Pakistan over Caretaker Prime Minister Anwar-ul-Haq Kakar’s post on X, formerly Twitter, that aid was being sent on Kabul’s request. The recent spate of Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions has come on the heels of Islamabad’s decision this month to unilaterally expel 1.7 million Afghan refugees by November 1. The Taliban regime strongly reacted to this announcement and urged Pakistan to reconsider its decision. These disagreements bring into sharp focus the tensions punctuating Afghanistan-Pakistan ties since the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021.

Two years of the Taliban’s interim rule in Afghanistan has replaced the initial euphoria in Pakistan of a friendly government in Kabul with a more somber realization of the political and security challenges it poses. Recurrent Islamabad-Kabul tensions have been shaped by persistent cross-border attacks and sanctuaries of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Pakistan’s refusal to diplomatically recognize the Taliban regime, the latter’s reluctance to accept the Durand Line as an international border, the question of refugees as well as the intermittent border flare ups and closures. Despite mounting tensions, the ties have not broken down completely.

The foremost factor undermining bilateral relations is TTP’s cross-border attacks and havens in Afghanistan. In September, tensions boiled over when TTP, after amassing fighters in Kunar and Nuristan provinces, launched a major raid in Chitral to gain control of some villages. Though Pakistani security forces repulsed the attack, it took them several days to clear the areas. Islamabad maintains that the Taliban are sheltering and patronizing TTP, which has provided it with operational space to plot and launch cross-border attacks. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s fencing of the porous border with Afghanistan to stop cross-border militant movement and attacks has proven to be ineffective. 

In their bid to dispel the impression of being a Pakistani proxy and to win the sympathies of Pashtun nationalists, the Taliban are using the Afghanistan-Pakistan border issue as a political tool. 

Abdul Basit Khan

It bears mention that TTP pledges its oath of allegiance to the Taliban’s Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and seeks spiritual guidance from him. Since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, TTP has also reshaped its organizational framework along the Taliban’s insurgency model by dividing its presence in Pakistan into nine so-called shadow provinces, seven ministries and two military zones. Pakistan has asked the Taliban regime to fulfil its obligations under the Doha Agreement 2020 and neutralize TTP’s presence on Afghan soil, or hand over the group’s leaders and fighters. However, the Taliban regime terms TTP as Pakistan’s internal problem and denies its presence in Afghanistan. The Taliban maintains that Pakistan should not blame them for its internal security failures. They have also refused to accept Pakistan as a party to the Doha Agreement. 

Though it remains to be seen if Pakistan has the logistical means and infrastructure to repatriate such a large number of refugees, the unilateral decision has garnered a strong reaction from the Taliban. Pakistan maintains that 14 of the 24 suicide attacks in Pakistan in 2023 have been carried out by Afghan nationals. If Pakistan starts a crackdown against unregistered Afghan refugees and compels them to leave the country, it will further strain already tense Afghanistan-Pakistan ties.

Pakistan’s reluctance to diplomatically recognize the Taliban regime has also stoked Islamabad-Kabul tensions. During the insurgency, Pakistan not only hosted the Taliban’s top leadership in Balochistan, but also helped the group negotiate the exit deal with the US which paved the way for its return to power. The Taliban expected Pakistan to immediately grant it diplomatic recognition. However, Islamabad has kept its policy consistent with the international community’s approach of not recognizing the Taliban regime in the absence of an ethnically and politically inclusive government, granting girls and women their right to education and work, as well as making sure that Afghan soil is not used for terrorism against other countries. Unfortunately, Pakistan is the most affected country by terrorism (a surge of 72 percent) since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan. 

The Taliban’s support for TTP and disinclination to accept the border as an internationally accepted boundary has accentuated Pakistani mistrust toward the Taliban regime. In their bid to dispel the impression of being a Pakistani proxy and to win the sympathies of Pashtun nationalists, the Taliban are using the Afghanistan-Pakistan border issue as a political tool. 

Pakistan’s tense relations with the Taliban regime have left it between a rock and a hard place. On one hand, the Taliban’s reluctance to cooperate against TTP and recognize the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has compelled the state to revisit the rationale of supporting the militant group. The status quo will only add more problems to Pakistan’s never-ending litany of internal and external challenges. 

On the other hand, the Taliban have restored order in Afghanistan and if their regime is destabilized, it will push Afghanistan into a civil war— which is a recipe for a bigger disaster than existing predicaments. Pakistan will have to use a combination of diplomacy and security strategies to navigate this policy conundrum. 

- The author is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. Twitter: @basitresearcher