Pakistan’s asymmetric militant threats: From escalation to expansion

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)’s abortive attempt to take control of two villages in Chitral from Afghanistan’s Kunar and Nuristan provinces on September 6, and four attacks in different parts of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces on September 28 bring into sharp focus the escalation and expansion of Pakistan’s asymmetric threats. 

Since August 2021, militant violence in Pakistan has surged by 73% due to the regrouping of different terror networks. However, recent attacks across the northwestern and southwestern peripheries underscore the expansion of conflict. In the face of these rapidly evolving asymmetric threats, Pakistan’s counterterrorism framework looks dated and requires immediate revisions to cope with the ever-changing threat landscape.

The way TTP’s raid in Chitral manifested both in the physical and cyber spaces is one measure of the evolved asymmetric threats in Pakistan. Though TTP never succeeded in gaining control of any village in Chitral, the misinformation warfare by the group’s social media propagandists created a lot of confusion, rumors and conspiracy theories. On top of that, the state’s counterproductive media blackout of Chitral’s situation gave TTP’s propagandists a field day to spread their propaganda narratives. The damage had been done by the time the state stepped in to fill the information vacuum. Most of it played out on X, formerly Twitter, where Elon Musk’s decision to do away with the Trust and Safety Council has turned the platform into a digital haven for militants of all hues and stripes, including TTP. The Pakistani counterterrorism authorities will have to pay particular focus to information warfare in the digital space to effectively tackle evolving extremist threats in the future.

The emerging security situation in Pakistan ahead of the elections resembles more the 2008 and 2013 elections’ volatile environment and less the 2018 polls’ relatively peaceful atmosphere.

Abdul Basit Khan

TTP’s attempt to gain a territorial foothold in Chitral with hundreds of militants amassing in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Nuristan provinces indicates the group’s growing organizational capabilities. Ostensibly, TTP tried to open a new front to distract Pakistani forces’ attention from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and stretch their presence thin to ease the counterterrorism pressure in the ex-FATA region. Critically, ahead of approaching winter, TTP’s attempt to capture some territory in Chitral could have been motivated by the desire to dispel the impression that it operates out of Afghanistan. A semblance of territorial control in Chitral would have given TTP plausible deniability. 

Besides, TTP is trying to evolve from a guerrilla to an insurgent group for which some control of territory and pockets of public support are necessary. Also, Chitral is strategically located closer to Gilgit-Baltistan, the starting point of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, and shares a border with Tajikistan via the Wakhan Corridor and is located closer to Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, which abuts China’s Xinjiang province. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Al-Qaeda’s South Asian franchise, in the October issue of its flagship Urdu-language propaganda magazine, Nawa-e-Gahzwa-e-Hind, has praised TTP’s Chitral attack. AQIS’ endorsement of TTP’s attack in a strategically important area indicates some form of collaboration between the two groups. It bears mention that two AQIS factions are among the 40 militant groups which have pledged allegiance to TTP’s chief Nur Wali Mehsud, since July 2020. The media has already reported that some elements of the Taliban also participated in the Chitral attack. The militant buildup against Pakistan in the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan is real. It requires rethinking the existing counterterrorism framework for more effective deterrence against cross-border assaults like the Chitral attack.

Furthermore, the two suicide bombings on September 28 in Hangu and Mastung were not claimed by any militant group. In fact, TTP distanced itself from both incidents, while the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, Daesh-Khorasan and the little-known Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP) are still silent. In recent months, TJP, apparently a front of TTP, has carried out some high-profile suicide attacks in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, some of which were also claimed by Daesh-K. Also, in a few instances, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), a sub-faction of TTP, and TJP simultaneously claimed some attacks, triggering confusion and blame games. Against this backdrop, complete silence on two major suicide bombings could be due to disagreements among these groups, mainly considering that they respectively hit a procession celebrating Prophet Muhammad’s birthday and a mosque during Friday prayer. Fearing public backlash for targeting a mosque and a religious gathering, militant groups have shied away from taking credit.

From the Taliban’s takeover until recently, most of the terror attacks in Pakistan hit hard targets. However, the four attacks reported on September 28 targeted both hard and soft targets. This conflict trend-line ahead of the general elections expected to take place in January next year is alarming. It will make the security forces’ job even more difficult to hold elections in a peaceful and secure environment. Daesh-K termed its attack against a political rally of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal (JUIF) in Bajaur district in August as part of its so-called war against democracy. Against this backdrop, Daesh-K will try to target political gatherings in Pakistan to dispel the impression of being wiped out in the Taliban’s ruthless crackdown in Afghanistan. The emerging security situation in Pakistan ahead of the elections resembles more the 2008 and 2013 elections’ volatile environment and less the 2018 polls’ relatively peaceful atmosphere.

Keeping the above in view coupled with developments in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s existing counterterrorism framework has run its course. It requires a massive overhaul to respond to evolved asymmetric threats both online and offline. To this end, a new national consensus is critical in responding to emboldened extremist networks which are gradually expanding their outreach to the mainland after escalating violence in the border peripheries.

– The author is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore.

Twitter: @basitresearcher