Why the Taliban has failed in Pakistan
While the Taliban in Afghanistan was the original version, its namesake in Pakistan is a copy. However, the copy evolved its own distinct characteristics with the passage of time. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or the TTP, was formed as a result of the Pervez Musharraf government’s policies after 2001. Though the TTP continued to acknowledge Mullah Omar as its leader, it followed a rather independent agenda. As the Afghan Taliban scrupulously followed a policy of non-interference in Pakistan, the TTP chose to confront the state.
The most potent state institution that TTP took on was the Pakistan Army, and it grossly underestimated its strength as one of the best forces in the world. The government and the armed forces initially thought TTP’s behavior could be modified and entered into a number of agreements with it, which invariably broke down. Then the US authorities decided to attack TTP cadres with remote-controlled drone strikes. Ironically, while such strikes did weaken this organization, they also created sympathy for it across Pakistan. However, due to a lack of proper political experience, the TTP failed to cash in on that.
The TTP, through a lack of education, chose a narrative of retrogression. It openly proclaimed that it abhorred the state, its democratic system and the constitution. It opposed female education and the empowerment of women, saying that women only had a role within the confines of their homes. Their wishful policy of dragging Pakistan back to medieval times was out of sync with the prevailing conditions. Educated Pakistanis, the urban elite in particular, were in no way prepared to accept its retrogressive policies. But the tables were turned and the die was clearly cast against the TTP when it opted to kill innocent Pakistanis.
To begin with, the TTP had some voices, though very few, in the government and opposition alike. Imran Khan was once chided as “Taliban Khan” for his soft attitude toward the TTP. But, when the Taliban started attacking Pakistani military installations of a sensitive nature, Khan had to acknowledge that it had been infiltrated by enemy agencies.
When the TTP alienated the population through its own acts of terrorism, it lost the vital oxygen necessary for its survival.
Javed Hafeez
When TTP Chief Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in a US drone attack in 2013, the then-Jamaat-e-Islami Emir Syed Munawar Hasan called him a “Shaheed” (martyr). When asked whether the Pakistani soldiers laying down their lives in the war on terror were also martyrs in his opinion, he was non-committal. This statement became too controversial for his own party to accept and he was replaced as emir at the next election. Even the religious parties were now distancing themselves from the Taliban narrative.
A golden rule of military strategy forbids the opening of too many fronts at the same time. But TTP started attacking military installations and innocent citizens in one go. And, when it opted to kill innocent schoolchildren in Peshawar in December 2014, all residual sympathy for it evaporated in no time. At this point, the army chief said that the danger to Pakistan from within was greater than the threat from outside.
The civilian leadership and military command were now on the same page to fight this deadly menace. The valiant armed forces of Pakistan fought gallantly to root out the scourge of terrorism from the country in general and the tribal areas in particular. The victories were spectacular. It was no small feat to root out the terrorists who had established their command and control centers deep in mountain tunnels.
An important rule of guerilla warfare is an excellent relationship with the local civilian population in order to gain safe operational space. The TTP ignored this rule at its peril. A friendly civilian population provides safe havens, secure financial channels and logistics to the non-state actors. You cannot survive in a pond after muddying its water. When the TTP alienated the population through its own acts of terrorism, it lost the vital oxygen necessary for its survival. In fact the TTP, in its later years, had merely become a brand name used by various criminal gangs to further their agendas. It was no longer a coherent outfit with a single command.
Objective conditions in Pakistan today are very different. Another peaceful transfer of power through the ballot box is around the corner and the tribal area is being merged with the province of KP. Pakistan today follows its own independent policy on Afghanistan, so the chances of a Taliban revival are minimal. But a physical defeat of the Taliban does not mean that its mindset has been defeated once and for all. TTP segments present across the border also remain to be tackled. Nevertheless, Pakistan is now well equipped to meet those challenges with the wisdom and tenacity required.
- Javed Hafeez is a former Pakistani diplomat with much experience of the Middle East. He writes weekly columns in Pakistani and Gulf newspapers and appears regularly on satellite TV channels as a defense and political analyst. Twitter: @hafiz_javed
