Why are foreign militants not returning to Afghanistan despite Taliban’s return to power?
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A recent UN report indicates that with minor exceptions, foreign militants have not returned to Afghanistan despite the restoration of Taliban’s regime. The UN report’s finding runs contrary to the widespread apprehensions that the Taliban’s return to power and the accompanying triumphant narrative would turn Afghanistan into a hub of transnational militancy. At the same time, the report cautions that it is too early to jump to conclusions. It might take militant groups like Al-Qaeda 12 to 18 months to revive and attract fresh recruits to Afghanistan. Reportedly, Al-Qaeda still enjoys a haven, the Taliban’s protection and freedom of operation in Afghanistan.
Against this backdrop, it is crucial to explore why Afghanistan has not attracted foreign militants and whether this trajectory is likely to continue in the coming months and years as well. It bears mention that Afghanistan retains its allure in the global militant discourse as the prophesied ‘Land of Khorasan’ from where the Army of Black Flags will rise towards the end of times. Various militant groups, such as Daesh’s Afghan affiliate Daesh-Khorasan have used the Khorasan moniker with their name. Likewise, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s current spokesman uses Khorasani as an alias, i.e., Muhammad Khorasani. In the historical context, the term Khorasan refers to a region comprising northeastern Iran, southern Turkmenistan and northern Afghanistan.
Unlike the 1980s and 1990s, when Afghanistan was the most traveled destination for foreign militants, they are spoiled for choices in the present era. There are several ongoing conflicts in different parts of the Muslim world where militants can partake. For the Middle Eastern militants, three active conflict theatres are available in the region, i.e., Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Similarly, there are several conflict hotspots in Africa, such as Somalia, Nigeria, and Mali. Hence, Afghanistan is one of many choices for militant radicals.
Furthermore, the split of the global militant movement between Al-Qaeda and Daesh also accounts for the declining appeal of Afghanistan for foreign militants. In 2014, when Daesh burst onto the scene in Iraq, it invited like-minded radicals to come and live in territories under its control in the Greater Levant region. As a result, several thousand militants from different parts of the world, including Afghanistan, traveled to Iraq and Syria. With this development, the epicenter of global militancy moved from Afghanistan to Iraq and Syria, lessening the appeal of Afghanistan. It is essential to mention that Daesh-K has attracted Central Asian and South Asian militants to its hideouts in Afghanistan, but their numbers are negligible.
Another factor explaining the negligibly low number of foreign militants traveling to Afghanistan is the absence of a charismatic and iconic figure. In the 1990s, Afghanistan had two towering figures, Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s founding leader, and Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda founder and chief, whose stature was larger than life for militants. Presently, with the exception of Al-Qaeda chief Ayman Al-Zawahiri, there is a leadership crisis in the global militant movement. Also, Zawahiri is not as charismatic as Bin Laden was. Though Al-Qaeda-linked militants respect him, his appeal pales into insignificance compared to that of Mullah Omar and Bin Laden. Hence, a strong pull factor is missing, serving as a catalyst for militants to return to Afghanistan.
Presently, with the exception of Al-Qaeda chief Ayman Al-Zawahiri, there is a leadership crisis in the global militant movement.
Abdul Basit Khan
At the same time, Al-Qaeda is also mindful of the Taliban’s limitations and obligations under the Doha Agreement. As per the accord, the Taliban promised the US that Afghanistan’s soil would not be used for terrorist attacks against Washington and its allies. Though Al-Qaeda celebrated the Taliban’s victory as its success, the group keeps a low profile, not to add to the Taliban’s long list of internal and external challenges. Under the Taliban’s rule, Al-Qaeda enjoys a haven and freedom of movement. Hence, instead of resurrecting its external operations unit in Afghanistan, the militant group is using its Afghan sanctuary to keep the movement alive, stay in touch with its regional affiliates in different parts of the world and plot attacks against the West from elsewhere.
As the global militant movement has evolved in the last few years, its strategies and operational tactics have also changed. While the ends of the global militant movement are still the same, the violent means have transformed. The era of terror spectaculars or high-profile attacks, such as the 9/11 incident or the London and Madrid bombings, is over. It has been replaced with low-end urban terrorism like knife and vehicular ramming attacks carried out by lone actors. This development, coupled with the advent of social media, has alleviated the need for physical travel and training, resulting in the declining number of militants traveling to Afghanistan. Primarily, the threat of lone-actor terrorism to the West is homegrown and since it involves rudimentary skillsets of knife stabbing or vehicular ramming, no rigorous training is required, which necessitated the travel in yester years. In the present era, the recruitment, ideologization, plotting and coordination of terror attacks are done on encrypted social media platforms.
Soon after the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, there was a lot of online chatter among the would-be radicals to travel to Afghanistan. However, enhanced border controls and travel restrictions put in place due to the COVID-19 pandemic and better situational awareness of the law enforcement agencies about the patterns of the militant movement have deterred would-be radicals from traveling to Afghanistan.
Finally, the Taliban have evolved as a militant group; they have struggled hard to resurrect their overthrown regime in Afghanistan. Hence, they see an incentive to keep the foreign militants away from Afghanistan and cooperate with regional and global powers to curb this trend. The Taliban realize that to engage with the international community, they will have to address its genuine concerns, particularly those linked to transnational terrorism. Hence, while the Taliban are still hosting Al-Qaeda remnants in Afghanistan, they see no incentive to welcome foreign militants.
In the last two decades, Afghanistan has come a long way and has been through a lot. The trend observed in the UN report will be a sigh of relief for Afghanistan and its neighboring countries, which have paid a heavy price in the US-led war on terror. However, continued vigilance, cooperation, and coordination are needed to ensure this trend’s permanency.
— The author is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore.
Twitter @basitresearcher.
