Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s spring offensive and rebranding
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According to the Inter-Services Public Relations, Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) has killed 105 Pakistani soldiers in the ex-FATA region, now merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, in 2022. Of these, as many as 24 security personnel alone were killed in April, compelling Pakistan to retaliate through drone strikes against suspected TTP hideouts in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Khost provinces. TTP’s fresh wave of attacks is part of its Al-Badar offensive announced on March 31. On April 21, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif visited the North Waziristan tribal district along with the army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa, underscoring the deteriorating security situation along the Pak-Afghan border.
TTP’s announcement of its spring offensive indicates how the terror group is continuously adapting the Afghan Taliban’s playbook since the latter’s takeover of Afghanistan. Following the proclamation of the Al-Badar offensive, TTP has claimed as many as 20 terrorist attacks in north-western Pakistan. Since August, TTP has made significant operational and strategic adjustments in its strategic goals and tactics, and it poses a long-term externally directed internal security threat to Pakistan.
Ahead of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, TTP localized its focus concentrated on transforming Pakistan into a Taliban-style Islamic Emirate. In 2021, TTP refuted a UN report attributing unifications of its various factions to Al-Qaeda’s mediation. TTP vehemently denied any association with al-Qaeda and portrayed itself as a Pakistan-focused group. TTP’s behavior of disassociating itself from al-Qaeda is consistent with the Taliban’s modus operandi where the latter publicly downplayed its ties with al-Qaeda.
Likewise, TTP also denounced Daesh-Khorasan last year by terming the latter’s claim to the self-styled Caliphate as bogus and unlawful. Though Daesh-K comprises of TTP’s breakaway faction from Orakzai and Bajaur tribal districts, the latter never publicly criticized it. TTP’s open critique of Daesh-K is also consistent with the Taliban’s policy of censuring the latter. TTP’s critique of Daesh-K was also part of its strategy to move away from transnational terrorism and showcase itself only as a local militant group focused on Pakistan and Pashtun grievances.
Another linked but separate trend which stands out in TTP’s rebranding is its increasing emphasis on Pashtun-centric narratives of the ex-FATA region. TTP has carefully structured its militant activism around the issues of opposing the fencing of the Pak-Afghan border, 97 percent of which has been fenced and the remaining work will be completed in the next few months. TTP’s cross-border attacks on the Pakistani security forces are part of its stance to oppose the Pak-Afghan border’s fencing. Similarly, TTP violently opposes the ex-FATA region’s merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Likewise, TTP in its various statements and propaganda publications has raised objections over the Pakistan Army’s presence in the ex-FATA region. A careful examination of TTP’s statements and speeches reveal a continuous reference to the Pashtun tribal way of life and preservation of tribal norms and traditions.
Another linked but separate trend which stands out in TTP’s rebranding is its increasing emphasis on Pashtun-centric narratives of Pakistan's ex-FATA region.
Abdul Basit Khan
Since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, TTP has made subtle adjustments in its operational tactics as well. The terror group in the last few months has revised its targeting strategy from discriminate to indiscriminate violence. TTP militants now target Pakistani security and law enforcement agencies instead of hitting soft targets. Seemingly, the shift from indiscriminate to discriminate targeting strategy is aimed at winning public sympathy.
In its current shape, TTP is a terrorist groups which is behaving like an insurgency without necessarily being one. Such terrorist groups which behave like insurgencies without possessing territory or public support, the two most-critical components to qualify as an insurgency, can be classified as a proto-insurgency or a hybridized terrorist group. TTP’s current chief Mufti Nur Wali Mehsud is credited with bringing the afore-mentioned changes in the group’s organizational structure, operational tactics and strategic goals.
In recent months, TTP has emerged as a source of tension and friction between Pakistan and the Taliban regime. Despite repeated Pakistani requests, the Taliban termed TTP Pakistan’s internal matter and maintained that it was for the latter to decide how to handle the former. The Taliban-mediated one-month truce (November 9 to December 9) between Pakistan and TTP also broke down last December.
Recent media reports indicate that TTP is collecting donations in Kabul for its violent campaign against Pakistan. Similarly, the posters of former TTP chief Hakimullah Mehsud have been spotted alongside other Taliban leaders who are considered war heroes by the incumbent Taliban regime. The Taliban have deep rooted ethnic, political and ideological links with TTP. After 9/11, TTP sheltered different Taliban commanders and fighters in their erstwhile strongholds of the ex-FATA region. The Taliban are now returning the favour by reciprocating the same sentiment.
Taking another leaf out of Taliban’s playbook, TTP has increased the volume of its propaganda against Pakistan. TTP comments on all important developments in Pakistan. Recently, it issued a statement on the ongoing political turmoil in Pakistan portraying the Taliban-style Sharia system as the real answers to Pakistan’s political predicament. TTP brings out infographics, audio, video statements and speeches to articulate its position on different issues concerning Pakistan.
Pakistan will have to revive the National Action Plan alongside revisiting the ongoing counter-terrorism operation in the Pak-Afghan border areas. At the same time, Pakistan will have to re-evaluate TTP’s goals and strategies against the backdrop of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan to effectively counter its threat.
- The author is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. Twitter @basitresearcher.
