The P-5 pledge for nuclear arms control is largely only theoretical
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The increasing geopolitical competition among the great powers has not shunned the nuclear taboo- a normative inhibition against the first use of atomic weapons. On January 3, the P-5, once again, reiterated thwarting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ensuring the prevention of a nuclear war. This is a sign of relief for the international community. Besides, Pakistan also concurred and endorsed the nuclear-weapon states’ non-proliferation agenda to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and reiterated his strategic restrain regime proposal to endure strategic stability in South Asia.
The four interlinked dynamics, i.e., a vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, increasing tensions between Russia and the United States on the Ukraine front, Washington’s determination to contain China, and the Indian ruling elite’s threat of surgical strikes against alleged “militant launch pads” in Kashmir alarmed about the probability of a military conflict with nuclear dimensions.
The NPT remains the cornerstone of the nonproliferation order but is encountering serious challenges. Since last year, its tenth review conference has been postponed due to the pandemic. Similarly, Pakistan’s Strategic Restraint Regime proposal encompassing nuclear and missile restraint, conventional balance, and settlement of disputes has failed to attract India’s positive response. The arms race in the conventional and strategic domain negatively influences regional strategic stability.
The NPT signatories with nuclear weapons— China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States— committed to eventually disarm (Article VI). However, in reality, they are advancing their nuclear arsenals. Besides, it empowers the IAEA to stringently scrutinize nuclear research and energy programs of non-nuclear weapon states through the enforcement of nuclear safeguards. The IAEA failed to desist Iran, a member of NPT, from developing advanced uranium enrichment capability.
Although Islamabad applauded the P-5 Joint Statement on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races as a positive development, it expressed its pessimism over the absence of serious global disarmament initiative and a hostile security environment.
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal
The replica of North Korea, i.e. exiting the NPT by employing the withdrawal clause and testing nuclear weapons, continuously haunts the treaty members about the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the international community is concerned about Iran’s increasing uranium enrichment capability. Moreover, Tehran’s advancing nuclear program induces the regional powers to invest in their respective nuclear programs to balance perceived nuclear-armed Iran in the future.
Ironically, all the nuclear-armed states steadfastly oppose the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons but engage in vertical proliferation. They have invested in the new generation of tactical nuclear weapons and supersonic nuclear-capable delivery vehicles. This trend is against the NPT’s primary objectives— nuclear arms control and disarmament.
Although Islamabad applauded the P-5 Joint Statement on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races as a positive development, it expressed its pessimism over the absence of serious global disarmament initiative and a hostile security environment.
The nuclear nonproliferation regime is gradually losing its efficacy due to the Americans’ withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty in 2002 and 1987 INF Treaty in 2019 and current Russian, Chinese, Indian, and Pakistanis modernization of their respective nuclear arsenals. Therefore, nuclear weapon states’ assurances are viewed as mere statements without having any tangible outcome. Realistically, without halting the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, the horizontal proliferation might be slowed or delayed but cannot be shunned completely.
The United States, historically with the Soviet Union and later with Russia, constituted and safeguarded the nuclear nonproliferation order. However, for advancing its geostrategic interests and revitalizing the domestic nuclear industry through power plant exports, Washington signed the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2005 and secured the Nuclear Supplier Group waiver for India in 2008, enabling India to purchase nuclear technology and material from the United States and others without renouncing its nuclear weapons program.
Moreover, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States inked a new strategic partnership (AUKUS) in October 2021, which enabled Australia to receive highly enriched fuel for nuclear-powered submarines. Even if Australia does not divert the highly enriched uranium to make bombs, it establishes a dangerous precedent for other non-nuclear weapon states purchase nuclear-powered submarines. Prior to ratifying NPT in 1973, elements within the Australian government made repeated attempts to acquire nuclear weapons.
To summarize, the nuclear-armed states understand and advocate that arms control is imperatives for global and regional strategic stability, but they fail to realize NPT objectives. The gap in theory and practice of nuclear arms control and existential hostility between India and Pakistan alarm about the strategic instability in South Asia.
- Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal is an Islamabad-based analyst and professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University. E-mail: [email protected] Twitter: @zafar_jaspal
