Uranium theft and the perils of India’s nuclear security
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The seizure of seven kg of highly radioactive uranium, worth 210 million in Indian currency, from a scrap dealer in India’s commercial capital Mumbai earlier this month has put the focus back on the safety of weapon-grade nuclear material available in the country. The fact is, uranium, used as a ballast for counterweight in industrial manufacturing, is not returned to atomic energy agencies mandatorily when machines are sold as scrap at the end of their life span. Consequently, Indian authorities have intermittently recovered this naturally occurring radioactive element from the open market, even though there is a legal ban on its private trade.
While the government did report such incidents occasionally to the global nuclear regulatory watchdog IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) to meet disclosure requirements, the very fact of more than half of the cases being attributed to theft leaves a wide scope for strengthening the monitoring mechanism, apart from introducing domestic nuclear regulatory reforms.
India being a responsible player in the domain of atomic energy, I can recall the eminent nuclear scientist Dr. Anil Kakodkar advocating radical improvement in governance and decision-making structures at the utility level, during a conversation with me. A nation aiming to be a major nuclear design-cum-manufacturing hub and a leading player in global nuclear commerce surely cannot let her guard down to bolster a flourishing black market of sensitive radioactive elements. It is absolutely undeniable that a huge amount of uranium in varying form – including rod, granular, semi-processed and radioactive, has found its way into the shadowy unregulated space often controlled by the underworld.
The 2014 Kalpakkam (Madras) Atomic Power Station shooting brought to the fore a critical question concerning internal sabotage. Global experts wondered if India, with its history of civil tumult, is adequately prepared to safeguard the building blocks of a devastating nuclear bomb from being stolen by insiders out of grievances or ill motive. There is enough documentary evidence on nuclear security lapses spread over the last few decades that should make the policymakers and strategic security community sit up and take notice. From criminal gangs getting hold of several kg of semi-processed uranium belonging to a state-owned mine in Meghalaya, federal politicians orchestrating an operation to siphon 100 kg of uranium from Jharkhand, mining employees selling milled uranium to militant groups to leftist guerrillas strapping uranium ore obtained from government-run milling complexes– all lay bare the skeletons of India’s security practices in nuclear installations.
A nation aiming to be a major nuclear design-cum-manufacturing hub and a leading player in global nuclear commerce surely cannot let her guard down to bolster a flourishing black market of sensitive radioactive elements.
Seema Sengupta
As we debate the safety of India’s nuclear explosive materials, one issue that raises serious concern is the phenomenon of smuggling rackets associated with illicit snake venom trade getting hold of a highly radioactive substance like radium. The law enforcement agencies in my home province Bengal have been diligently tracking a spurt in the use of radium-laced distilled water for preserving illegally obtained snake venoms worth billions of dollars in the international market. Investigators also discovered that specially imported containers made of Belgian bullet-proof glass are being used as carriers to smuggle toxins extracted from live snakes, which eventually adds value to contraband drugs like marijuana and cocaine.
A detailed assessment of safeguard mechanisms for materials that can be potentially used in explosives or ‘dirty bombs’ manufacturing reveals a grim picture of serious shortcomings. Besides, lapses were found in areas of material control, accounting, transport security, personnel vetting and reporting of suspicious behavior. On security practices efficacy, the US intelligence community even placed India below Pakistan and Russia – two countries best known for provoking western anxieties. There are critical issues with vetting and monitoring of key security personnel, tracking of explosives’ quantities and whereabouts, and the effective use of detectors at nuclear facilities and their portals. True, everything that India has done to protect her nuclear facilities is not visible to the naked eye because of her paranoia with obsessive secrecy, but there is no scope for complacency yet because unfamiliar grounds have to be traversed.
*Seema Sengupta is a Kolkata-based journalist and columnist.
