The purport of the Indo-Pakistan cease-fire agreement
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Perceptive observers of past Indo-Pakistan exchanges-- largely acrimonious and accusatory-- may have noted the change of tone reflected in PM Imran Khan’s address to the Trade and Investment Conference in Sri Lanka. When asked to comment, one made much of the maturity with which Khan had laid out the foreign policy of his government. One lauded his focus on connectivity and the emphasis he and his ministers laid on Pakistan’s locational advantage being ‘geoeconomics’ and not geostrategic or geopolitical.
Some observers in Pakistan may feel that the cease-fire agreement with India (whether this was worked out in clandestine meetings or through trusted intermediaries is immaterial), is a step too far without there being a firm commitment by both India and Pakistan for resuming dialogue on this issue. It can be argued, righty one feels, that the agreement when it says, “The two DGMOs agreed to address each other’s core issues and concerns which have the propensity to disturb peace and lead to violence,” is addressing this need admittedly in deliberately ambiguous language. Both sides know that if this interpretation is not shared, the agreement will fall apart almost immediately.
The agreement has received a warm welcome in relevant quarters. President Biden’s Press Secretary termed it “a positive step toward greater peace and stability in South Asia” while the UN Secretary General’s spokesperson said, the Secretary General was “encouraged” by the joint statement issued by the militaries of India and Pakistan. Both, it should be noted, are calling for continued engagement.
If there is stability, Saudi Arabia’s planned refinery and oil complex in Pakistan, Qatar’s investment of its LNG revenues in Pakistan’s agriculture and livestock sectors and Kuwait’s desire to expand economic relations with Pakistan could move ahead faster, generating the employment needed by the country's “youth bulge.”
Najmuddin A. Shaikh
What is important is how potential investors will view this thaw in Indo-Pak relations. Today even as the GCC countries seek to explore investment opportunities in South Asia, fear of tensions between nuclear armed India and Pakistan acts as a deterrent. If there is stability, Saudi Arabia’s planned refinery and oil complex in Pakistan, Qatar’s investment of its LNG revenues in Pakistan’s agriculture and livestock sectors and Kuwait’s desire to expand economic relations with Pakistan could move ahead faster, generating the employment needed by the country’s “youth bulge.”
The pandemic has hit Pakistan but not as badly as was initially feared. The efforts that have been made on the circular debt will soon bear fruit. Improving governance remains an issue and requires further work as does population planning-- but one can be optimistic. On the foreign policy front, Pakistan has not been taken off the FATF grey list but it is likely that by June this problem too will be resolved because there is a belated realization that this is imperative for our internal stability independent of external pressures.
India may be advocating self-reliance but it too wants to create a climate in which foreign investors can feel freer to invest in the country. PM Modi’s pursuit of ‘Hindu Rashtra,’ his dictatorial approach to the Kisan movement and his suppression of voices of dissent has created divisions within the country. He is still sure of American support. Much as the Biden administration would like to uphold values-- these are in India’s case ‘trumped’ by realpolitik considerations. The Indians realize however that private investors, Americans and others, will have a different calculation.
The Chinese have surely been consulted or kept informed of the negotiations for the cease-fire agreement and one can be certain that they encouraged it given what they are doing with India themselves.
Proceeding with the Indians on military disengagement they have also signaled strongly their desire to repair the Indo-Chinese relationship. Today Indian efforts notwithstanding, China is India’s largest trading partner with volumes touching $77 billion against the $75 billion Indo-US trade. They are fighting in Indian courts the ban India has put on their high-tech applications. They have stated that they welcome the meeting of BRICS under India’s chairmanship and have said President Xi Jinping will attend the meeting scheduled for October.
Readers in Pakistan may also find interesting the fact that Article 6 the Boundary Agreement between Pakistan and China signed in 1963 states clearly that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will reopen negotiations with the China government so as to sign a formal boundary treaty to replace the present agreement. In the event of that sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provisions of this agreement and the aforesaid protocol shall be maintained in the formal boundary treaty to be signed between China and Pakistan. India had condemned this agreement and charged Pakistan with giving away large chunks of Kashmir’s territory to China without caring to note that the agreement was provisional and fully applicable only if Kashmir became part of Pakistan.
- Ambassador Najmuddin A. Shaikh is a former foreign secretary of Pakistan, and served as high commissioner to Canada, ambassador to Germany, US and Iran. He is a former member of the board of governors of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad and a founding member of the Karachi Council of Foreign Relations.
