New Taliban-US peace talks prompt cautious optimism
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Three months after US President Donald Trump pulled the plug on talks between the US government and the Taliban, negotiations have formally resumed.
Recent reporting indicates the two sides are working toward a deal that would involve reductions in violence — perhaps even a limited cease-fire — followed by an agreement on the withdrawal of US troops and the expectation of the launch of an intra-Afghan dialogue.
Significantly, this talk of reducing violence or declaring a cease-fire would apply only to hostilities between US forces and the Taliban. It would not affect fighting between Afghan forces and the Taliban, which would continue.
Nonetheless, the resumption of talks — and the apparent progress — is a major development, given that just a few weeks ago each side was back at square one with no clear path forward.
And yet we shouldn’t be surprised about this. When Trump called off negotiations in September, it was always apparent that Washington would eventually want them to resume. The Trump administration’s chief objective in South Asia is to withdraw forces from Afghanistan, and to get a deal with the Taliban that gives it political cover for the withdrawal. When Trump called off the talks, he had essentially concluded that the deal emerging at that time was not good enough. And, in retrospect, he was correct, given that it didn’t include any commitment to a reduction in violence or a cease-fire.
In the weeks following the suspension of talks, tell-tale signs emerged to suggest negotiations would soon resume. The two sides intensified the violence, indicating a desire to strengthen their bargaining position at the negotiating table. Then came a hostage release deal with the Taliban that freed two Western academics in exchange for several Taliban captives, including, significantly, Anas Haqqani, the brother of the Taliban’s second-in-command.
The hostage exchange provided a useful confidence-building measure to facilitate a resumption of talks. It also enabled Haqqani, one of the Taliban’s most powerful figures, to play a leading role in negotiations. Indeed, when talks resumed on Dec. 7, there were influential figures from both sides seated around the table including, according to some reports, Gen. Scott Miller, the top US commander in Afghanistan.
When Trump called off negotiations in September, it was always apparent that Washington would eventually want them to resume.
Michael Kugelman
This is not to say a deal is just around the corner, despite the remarkably optimistic assessment of one senior Taliban leader, who was anonymously quoted in a Pakistani newspaper as saying that Washington could announce an agreement by Christmas.
Indeed, the US side announced a brief pause in talks after a Taliban attack last week targeted Bagram Air Base, a key American military site in Afghanistan. Talks will likely resume soon enough, but the pause is a reminder of the fragility of the peace process.
More broadly, negotiations over reducing the violence — and how to define, measure and monitor such reductions — will take time. Washington will want to do everything possible to ensure that, if it agrees to a withdrawal of forces, those forces will not have to withdraw under fire. Such a prospect would not only be dangerous for US troops, but also a political nightmare for the Trump administration. With a US presidential election fast approaching, it would enable the president’s many critics to accuse the White House of surrender.
Another difficult negotiating topic is the nature of the withdrawal of US forces. The Taliban will want all troops out, while US representatives are likely to push for a gradual withdrawal that keeps several thousand in place to continue their mission of training and advising Afghan forces and carrying out counterterrorism activities.
Additionally, peace will remain a long way off even if the Taliban ends its fight against US forces to enable an American withdrawal. At that point, the core objective would be to launch intra-Afghan dialogue designed to lead to a political settlement that ends the war.
The problem is that the Afghan political situation, which is volatile and divided even under ordinary circumstances, is currently in complete disarray. With the results of a September presidential election indefinitely delayed, the country’s political future is utterly unclear. It is hard to imagine trying to build consensus within the Afghan political class for a pathway to peace when there is no new government in place.
The prospect of President Ashraf Ghani — a deeply unpopular figure in Afghanistan — leading this process during a paralyzing election crisis will not play well within the broader Afghan political class.
Furthermore, there are fundamental longer-term challenges, such as getting the Taliban to agree to a power-sharing deal or another form of political settlement, which would require the insurgents to participate in the type of system they have long rejected and vowed to overthrow by force.
For now, however, these concerns amount to putting the cart before the horse. The immediate goal, and the first step toward launching a long-elusive peace and reconciliation process, is to finalize a deal between the US and the Taliban.
Not too long ago, the prospect of a US-Taliban accord was dead in the water. Now, however, it has new-found momentum. This is cause for cautious optimism. Many difficult negotiations remain, but any negotiations are better than none.
– Michael Kugelman is deputy director of the Asia Program and senior associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Twitter: @michaelkugelman
