National Action Plan: Overview of impact
After a terrorist attack on a school in the northwestern city of Peshawar in 2014 where 149 people, mostly children, were killed by militants, the Pakistan government formulated a National Action Plan laying down comprehensive counterinsurgency measures to combat terrorism. A need was identified for an integrated approach in dealing with gangs that operated with the overt and covert backing of certain groups.
Consequently, a group of security-related experts established an action plan of 20 points with the sole purpose of eliminating organized and targeted attacks on government forces and installations.
Among other things, the plan outlined the establishment of a national counter-terrorism authority [NACTA], military courts, crack-downs on seminaries, the rehabilitation of displaced people and the repatriation of refugees. It also talked about ways to counter hatred and sectarianism, banning militant outfits and armed gangs, choking the finances of terrorist organizations and dismantling their communication networks.
As a matter of fact, these measures should have fallen into the purview of existing security institutions i.e. the police, the constabulary, the courts and essentially the entire criminal justice system. But these institutions were not prepared at the time to take on militant groups and lacked both the resolve and resources to do so.
The plan has achieved only partial success. In the tribal areas for example, the military operation had nothing to do with the action plan because security operations are simply not governed by such blueprints. True, there was a substantial decrease in the number of attacks after the military operation and a large number of militants were either killed or captured alive at a horrendous cost to locals.
But as far as the action plan goes, there is no evidence to show that the measures outlined in the blueprint can be attributed to improving the performance of security departments over the years. The impact of the military operation was certainly felt in the tribal areas and particularly in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. But across the country, there has been no dramatic or visible impact of the action plan itself.
There are many reasons for this. The government seemed to quickly lose the determination needed to pursue the implementation of the plan. The NACTA did not live up to expectations because of a lack of emphasis and interest from those in authority and the steps taken to regulate seminaries generated a strong backlash.
More importantly, militant outfits were not dismantled. There were compromises made all the way, leading to selective targeting of the problem with many militant groups simply left untouched.
As far as the action plan goes, there is no evidence to show that the measures outlined in the blueprint can be attributed to improving the performance of security departments over the years.
Rustam Shah Mohmand
A critical weakness appeared as the policy was put into practice. There was a complete lack of district level coordination. Effectively, there was nobody to manage and liaison between the work of several agencies dealing with peace and security. There was no empowered deputy commissioner in charge to lead the operation. This meant every agency was operating independently and sharing very little with other agencies.
In Pakistan’s administrative culture, there is usually an authorized coordinator, somebody well-respected across the board. Without this office, the agencies are effectively tone-deaf and functioning in their own vacuums. It is exactly this that has inhibited the criminal justice system from progressing since Pervez Musharraf abolished the most formidable pillar of administration in Pakistan i.e. the office of the district magistrate.
As a result, no corrective measures were ever taken to deal with the many technical and administrative issues that cropped up during the implementation of the national action plan.
After four years, we are left with little progress and a great deal of lessons. Without the strengthening of institutions and systems, the counter-terrorism blueprint cannot achieve much for long. There is also the need for institutionalized horizontal coordination among different agencies and the need to revive the office of the district magistrate taking control at the local level. And last but not least, the NACTA must be revived and its shortcomings dealt with.
– Rustam Shah Mohmand is a specialist of Afghanistan and Central Asian Affairs. He has served as Pakistan’s ambassador to Afghanistan and also held the position of Chief Commissioner Refugees for a decade.
